Structure and Dynamics of the Global Financial Network

Thiago Christiano Silva, Sergio Rubens Stancato de Souza and Benjamin Miranda Tabak

June, 2016
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Sergio Rubens Stancato de Souza**
Benjamin Miranda Tabak***

Abstract

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In this paper, we study the evolution of the network topology for the global financial market. We evaluate the level of diversification and participation of developed and emerging economies in cross-border exposures and find that the gross exposure network is dense, the vulnerability matrix is sparse, and the network’s fragility changes over time. Prior to the financial crisis in 2008, the network was relatively fragile, whereas it became more resilient afterwards, showing a reduction in financial institutions risk appetite. Our results suggest that financial regulators should track down the network evolution in their systemic risk assessment.

Keywords: network analysis, complex network, interbank market, global market.
JEL Classification: G01, G21, G28, C63.
1 Introduction

One of the main lessons of the 2008 crisis is that we live in an interconnected world. Financial systems, markets and instruments are not an exception. Since then, we have witnessed a crisis with unprecedented contagion that has had tremendous consequences in almost every corner of the world. Financial interconnectedness is at the top of the research agenda worldwide.

Although research on global financial interconnectedness has a tremendous relevance for the discussion of a more comprehensive approach for financial regulation, most papers have focused on domestic networks in specific countries, such as in Brazil (Cajueiro and Tabak (2008); Silva et al. (2016); Tabak et al. (2014)), the US (Soramäki et al. (2007)), Mexico (Martinez-Jaramillo et al. (2014)), Italy (Iori et al. (2008)), the Netherlands (in ’t Veld and van Lelyveld (2014)), Turkey (Kuźubaś et al. (2014)), among others.

This paper has a different perspective in the sense that it evaluates financial interconnectedness for a variety of countries using cross-border exposures data provided by the BIS. Therefore, it permits us to evaluate which countries are systemically important and how their importance evolves over time in the global financial network.

The paper contributes to the literature in two ways. In the first, we investigate how the network topology of the global financial network from 2005 to 2014 evolves by employing network measurements borrowed from the complex network theory. We give clear financial interpretations for the evaluated measures. In the second, we investigate how the network dynamics behaves by assessing the persistence of financial operations over different time frames.

We represent the global financial market as a hierarchical network with two levels. Countries that report cross-border exposures to the BIS comprise the network in its most aggregate view (upper view), while their respective financial sector, and public and private non-financial sectors compose the most granular view of the network (bottom view). In practice, the exposures take place in the bottom view of the network. However, due to the hierarchy, exposures in the bottom view also appear in the upper view in the form of country-level exposures. In this sense, if banks of country A are exposed to the private non-financial sector of country B in the bottom view, then the link from country A to B in the upper view will include this exposure, among other financial operations that exist between the same pair of countries.

We consider international claims of financial sectors toward any of others sectors of foreign countries. In this way, only the financial (banking) sector is present in the creditor endpoint of links in the network. In contrast, the financial sector, and private and public non-financial sectors can appear in the debtor endpoint.

We relate the degree and strength measures to the level of diversification and par-
ticipation of the countries, respectively. We find that the USA has the most diversified investment and funding portfolios. While its investment portfolio remains constant over time, the diversification of its funding portfolio increases from 2005 to 2014. We also observe that Oceanian and Asian countries tend to assume more diversified investment positions, but European and Latin American countries and Canada, on average, seem to reduce the diversification of their investment portfolios along the same period. We also see that all of the reporting countries, on average, show increasing participation in the international market, except for European countries, whose total investment amounts significantly decrease after the global financial crisis of 2007-2008.

Contrasting to domestic banking networks that are very sparse, we find that the country-level gross exposure network of the global financial network is very dense. Moreover, we observe that the vulnerability network is perceptibly sparse. In special, we see that the network is potentially more fragile in-between 2007 and 2008, period that coincides with the global financial crisis. We also observe that, from March 2005 to the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, the trajectory of the vulnerability network density assumes a consistent upward trend. After 2008, it rapidly drops down, suggesting that banks were less willing to accept risky positions.

We also find that the global financial network presents weak traces of disassortative mixing pattern. This feature contrasts with several works that analyze domestic interbank networks and conclude for the existence of strong disassortative patterns (Silva et al. (2015a, 2016); Souza et al. (2015)). The difference might arise because of the nature of the financial systems: while the global network has dense topological structures due to the high activity of its members (G10 and emergent countries), those domestic networks are very sparse, with a significant number of entities connected to a few money centers. A high network density increases the chances of pairs of countries with similar degree to connect to each other, thus incrementing the network assortativity.

We interpret the clustering coefficient as a measure of the level of substitutability of countries in normal times. When the clustering coefficient of a country is large, its counterparties tend to be densely interconnected. In this way, these counterparties can substitute that country to one of those counterparties easily, because they already maintain financial operations with them. We find that the USA and European countries tend to become less substitutable in the borrowing side, but more easily substitutable in the lending side. In contrast, the level of substitutability of Latin American, Oceanian, Asian countries and Canada, on average, does not seem to change significantly in the studied period.

We also analyze the dominance as a network measure that indicates the relative importance of a reference country as a lender or borrower to its neighbors. We find that the dominance of the USA as a lender largely increases after 2010 due to the large outflow of
investments performed by the USA after the failure of the Lehman Brothers. In contrast, European countries, on average, seem to lose importance as lenders in the studied period, while Oceanian and Asian countries have increasing dominance values in the lending perspective.

We investigate the existence of link reciprocity in the global financial network. We find that a large part of connections in the gross exposure network of the global financial market is mutual. Moreover, the link reciprocity seems to consistently increase from 2005 to 2014. We also study link reciprocity in the risk domain, i.e., in the vulnerability network. The occurrence of reciprocity in the risk domain contributes to increasing the speed of contagion because mutual links imply extended neighborhoods. In the risk dimension, we observe two behaviors in the link reciprocity of the vulnerability network. First, we see a large buildup in the link reciprocity before the global financial crisis. Following that event, just after the default of the Lehman Brothers, we observe a large decrease in the number of reciprocal links in the vulnerability domain.

We evaluate the network dynamics by analyzing how the observed link states change over time. In financial networks, the existence of persistent links between pairs of institutions may indicate preference attachment due to relationship lending or better contractual conditions in relation to the current market conditions. Unstaleness may arise due to reclassification of the counterparty; external events, such as defaults that may force market players to perform reallocation strategies; among others. We find a large investment persistence in the network. In the risk domain, we see a consistent increase in the persistence of links that can potentially lead to default, suggesting that, even though banks were very exposed to others in relation to their capability of absorbing losses, due to the optimistic global scenario, they kept maintaining these risky financial operations in the network. This scenario drastically changed after the global financial crisis onset, when the persistence of vulnerable links largely dropped. This fact suggests that banks were attempting to avoid long-term risky positions in the global market.

1.1 Notation

In order to analyze the network, we extract some network measurements from the graph \( G = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E}) \) constructed from the active international borrowing and lending relationships between reporting countries of the BIS. To build up such network, let \( \mathcal{V} \) denote the set of vertices (reporting country) and \( \mathcal{E} \), the set of edges (active operations). The cardinality of \( \mathcal{V}, N = |\mathcal{V}| \), represents the number of vertices or reporting countries in the network. The matrix \( A \) represents the assets matrix (weighted adjacency matrix), in which the \((i, j)\)-th entry represents the exposure of country \( i \) towards \( j \). We construct the set of edges \( \mathcal{E} \) using the filter over \( A \): \( \mathcal{E} = \{ A_{ij} > 0 : (i, j) \in \mathcal{V}^2 \} \). In our analysis, there is no
netting between $i$ and $j$. As such, if an arbitrary pair of countries owe to each other, then two directed independent edges linking each other in opposed directions will emerge. An interesting property of maintaining the gross exposures in the network is that, if a country defaults, its debtors remain liable for their debts. We also define the liabilities matrix as $L = A^T$, where $T$ is the transpose operator. Following the standard adopted by the BIS for supplying consolidated statistics of reporting countries, when we do not mention the type of network that we are using, it is assumed to be the assets matrix $A$.

### 1.2 Organization

The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present the data on the network of cross-border banks exposures reported by the BIS that we explore in this work. In Section 3 we describe the adopted network-based methodology. In Section 4 we discuss the main results and findings. Finally, in Section 5 we draw some conclusions about the obtained results.

### 2 Data

In this paper, we use data on cross-border exposures of banks from the Consolidated Banking Statistics dataset (CBS) that is maintained by the BIS. The CBS dataset holds data on consolidated positions of banks’ worldwide offices, including the positions of banks’ foreign subsidiaries and branches but excluding inter-office activity. Central banks and other official authorities collect data from individual consolidated banks headquartered in their jurisdiction and provide them to the BIS on a quarterly basis. The institutions considered as banks in each country include commercial banks, savings banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions or cooperatives, building societies and post-office savings banks or other government-controlled savings banks, but not central banks.

In this work, we investigate the evolution of those cross-border exposure networks from 2005 to 2014. We analyze, for each date, the network of banks’ cross-border exposures that are aggregated by country. In this way, we form a network of countries in which links are the aggregate gross exposures that countries hold against each other. We intend to assess banks’ exposures to other countries in a comprehensive way by considering banks’ exposures to banks, non-banks and to the public sector of other countries.

The CBS dataset compiles pairwise exposure data using two different criteria:

- **Immediate borrower basis**: Claims are allocated to the country of residence of the immediate counterparty. The data cover financial claims, risk transfers and certain liabilities reported by banks headquartered in the reporting country as well as selected affiliates of foreign banks.
• **Ultimate risk basis**: Claims are allocated to the country where the final risk lies. The data cover on-balance sheet claims as well as some off-balance sheet exposures of banks headquartered in the reporting country and provide a measure of country credit risk exposures consonant with banks’ own risk management systems.

In the main text of the paper, we opt to use the immediate borrower basis perspective for analyzing the cross-border network both in its structural and risk aspects. In the risk dimension, however, that choice is not perfectly accurate as in cases that there is risk transfer, the risk exposures change from creditor-debtor to creditor-guarantor-debtor. In the case of the ultimate risk basis perspective, in which creditors are represented as exposed to guarantors, if any guarantor defaults, it is not liable for the guarantee if the debtor does not default. In the immediate borrower basis perspective, in contrast, the origin and destination of risk propagation paths are correctly represented for all exposures. In this perspective, if an exposure has a guarantor, the links that would divide the risk path from the debtor to the creditor are not represented within the network. The origin and the destinations of the risk path, nonetheless, would remain correct in the immediate borrower basis perspective. For robustness, in Appendix A, we reapply our methodology to the network constructed using the ultimate risk basis approach and find that our conclusions that we draw using the immediate borrower basis approach still hold.

The 26 reporting countries of the BIS CBS in the immediate borrower perspective are:

• **America**: USA, Canada, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Panama;

• **Europe**: UK, Germany, France, Belgium, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland;

• **Asia**: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey; and

• **Oceania**: Australia.

Figure 1a presents the evolution of the total cross-border exposures (investments) of reporting countries’ banks. In this chart, we only report exposures between pairs of reporting countries. The BIS CBS data set also presents information on exposures to non-reporting countries. In these kinds of operation, however, the reporting countries always appear in the creditor endpoint of the cross-border operation, while a reporting or non-reporting country may appear in the debtor endpoint. In order to verify the representativeness of the network composed of only reporting countries, Table 1 shows the ratios of exposures between two reporting countries and between reporting countries and all countries. The sharp increase presented in Figure 1a from the beginning to March 2008 is not explained by a shift of the reporting countries exposures from non-reporting
countries to reporting countries, as the ratios presented in Table 1 remain roughly constant along the same period. The same applies to the sharp decrease from March 2008 to June 2009. Those movements could have been caused by changes in the volume of assets related to the growth and burst of the property market bubble, occurred mostly in the United States. That also may have affected non-reporting countries investments to the reporting ones. Another reason might be due to reclassification of US investment banks in the series, which became bank holding companies in September 2008. As a result, the BIS CBS started to include the international positions of these institutions.

Figures 1b, 1c, 1e, 1f show cross-border investments and liabilities of banks aggregated by groups of reporting countries. The groups have been devised using either importance of the country or geographical location. Along this paper, we report results for these country groups: USA, Europe, Latin America + Canada and Oceania + Asia. We also report the total or average amounts per group whenever applicable. Figures 1b and 1c portray the total cross-border assets and liabilities, respectively, discriminated according to those group formations. We see that investments performed by European countries are the most relevant to explain the increasing behavior of the total investment curve that is observed in Fig. 1a. The liabilities of European countries, however, also present similar behavior along the period, being the main destination of investments in that period. The US cross-border liabilities also show a similar behavior. Moreover, it is possible to see that, along the entire period, the fraction of intra-continental cross-border investments remained roughly constant for all groups, as we can see in Fig. 1d. Thus, the amount invested from one group to another (inter-group) depends more on resources availability than on shifts of investment preferences. Specifically, European countries kept about 60% of their resources invested within their group. Most of the remaining 40% were directed to the USA, given that the liabilities of the other groups are comparatively small. European countries are net lenders whereas the USA is a net borrower along the studied period. Countries from other groups, Latin America + Canada and Oceania + Asia, show, on average, increasing participation in the international market.

**Table 1:** Fraction of active operations between reporting countries to all available countries. Only reporting countries can figure in the creditor endpoint. In the debtor endpoint, both reporting and non-reporting countries may appear. Fractions are computed in March of each year.

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<tr>
<td>Ratio</td>
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The analysis of the average cross-border amounts per group reveals that the average European country is equivalent to the USA in the investment perspective by December 2008. From that date onwards, we see increasing investment amounts in the USA until
To estimate the country’s loss absorbing capabilities, we use bank-level data of each country. Due to lack of data, we assume a representative bank for possibly reflect the country’s quantitative easing programs QE 1 and QE 2.

Figure 1: Evolution of the total and average cross-border investments and liabilities performed by banks.

September 2012. In the same interval, the average investment performed on an European country consistently decreases. The increases in the USA cross-border investments possibly reflect the country’s quantitative easing programs QE 1 and QE 2.

To compute risk-related network measurements, we would ideally need to have bank-level data of each country. Due to lack of data, we assume a representative bank for each country in the sample. To estimate the country’s loss absorbing capabilities, we use
the total tier 1 capital of the country’s largest banks. We extract tier 1 capital data of these representative financial institutions from Bureau Van Dijk’s Bankscope and sum them up to obtain the aggregate tier 1 capital at the country level on a yearly basis. We preferably use consolidated accounting statements of all reporting financial institutions in Bankscope in these calculations. If a consolidated statement is not available, then we use an unconsolidated/aggregate accounting statement, whatever is available. Similarly, if accounting statements are available on both IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards) and Local GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) reporting conventions, then we adopt the first convention.

We assume two hypotheses when we sum up the tier 1 capital of the largest financial institutions to compose the country’s capital buffer:

1. The first one is that cross-border exposures are only present in largest financial institutions. That is, medium- and small-sized financial institutions do not hold foreign claims. In this way, we assume that the international banking market is a two-tier structure, where only large financial institutions operate across borders in the inter-bank market and act as money centers for smaller domestic banks. This is consistent with evidences found by Gropp et al. (2009), who show that small financial institutions neither cause nor suffer from cross-border contagion events, irrespective to the fact that all institutions are equally attainable to experience domestic contagion.

2. The second one is that the largest financial institutions of a same country share the country’s proxy when they absorb cross-border losses. This is a strong assumption that we make because we do not have information on bank-level cross-border exposures. Rather, we only have country-level information.

We only use the tier 1 capital of countries as a proxy of loss absorbing capability when computing the criticality and the vulnerability network of the global financial market. These measures only capture pairwise fragility between countries. Therefore, we do not account for indirect contagion in this paper. This setup somewhat mitigates our rough estimation of country’s capital buffer as the estimation error is not propagated forward in an indirect contagion process.

Figures 2a and 2b portray the total and average estimated countries’ capital buffers, respectively, for the studied period. We use the same groups of countries previously

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1We have checked that other measures that could proxy countries’ loss absorbing capabilities either are unavailable or are inconsistent with strong structural breaks inside the period that we perform the network analysis. The tier 1 measure, however, shows consistence and completeness during the period.

2We exclude central banks when estimating countries’ tier 1 capital.

3Even though the BIS CBS is reported on a quarterly basis, we opt to use annual tier 1 capital of financial institutions, because Bankscope has several missing values for the tier 1 capital of large financial institutions before June 2010 that cause strong structural breaks in the countries tier 1 capital series. In contrast, the
defined for better readability. We observe that, from the beginning of our sample until March 2009, capital buffers in European Countries and the USA roughly double, increasing even more afterwards. Latin America + Canada and Oceania + Asia also experience even steeper increases along the first period followed by stabilization (Latin America + Canada) or decrease (Oceania + Asia). This effect on Latin American, Canadian, Oceania and Asian banks suggests that they have been less affected by the debt crisis outbreak in European countries than the other two country groups. In contrast, recalling the total cross-border investments curve depicted in Fig. 1a, we see that total cross-border investments experience at most a 39% increase from the beginning to March 2008, consistently decreasing afterwards. The strategy of assuming higher and higher capitalization levels suggests that banks faced an increasing risk along the period of analysis.

![Graph of Total Capital Buffer](image1)

**Figure 2**: Total and average estimated countries’ capital buffers aggregated by groups.

### 3 Methodology

We represent the global financial market as a hierarchical network with two levels. We consider the aggregate exposures of countries in the upper view, while we unfold each of these countries in their respective financial sector, and public and private non-financial sectors in the bottom view. We perform the evaluation of network-based measures on the country-level network, i.e., the upper view perspective. By aggregating the financial sector, and public and private non-financial sectors into a single network vertex, we assume annual tier 1 capital data seem to be smoother and more consistent and are also reported in the entire studied period. Thus, we compose the capital buffer series of each country by replicating its annual capital buffer to the four quarters of the corresponding year. After that, we apply a moving average filter that smooths the capital buffer series with a span of 5. The moving average acts as a low-pass filter with filter coefficients equal to the reciprocal of the span, thus enabling us to capture the country’s capital buffer tendency in-between years. Though not providing exact results, this approximation still enables us to understand the topological features and risks embedded within the global financial network.
the following simplifications:

1. Shocks that originate from the non-payment of international obligations normally affect individual banks in the financial sector of a country, i.e., those that hold direct exposures to the defaulted debtor entities. However, due to the lack of data on domestic and international bank-level exposures, we aggregate the international assets and liabilities of banks of the same country’s financial sector as a single representative bank, which is the vertex that represents the country in the upper view. We understand that the most representative large banks in the same sector normally have the same capitalization pattern, suggesting that shocks affect these banks in a uniform manner.

2. Due to external shocks, the financial sector may affect the private and public non-financial sectors. The aggregation of these sectors in a single representative country-level vertex implicitly supposes that the reactions of these sectors are transmitted to international creditors in a simultaneous manner.

3. The non-financial sectors depend on the financial sector to obtain credit, maturity transformation, and financial services. If the financial sector collapses due to a financial crisis, we expect a rapid increase in the default rates of the private non-financial sector. In contrast, the public non-financial sector may still honor its liabilities in a first moment, but that scenario may change in case the crisis lingers. In our model, we suppose that, once the financial sector collapses, both the private and public non-financial sectors collapse as well, which yields very conservative results.

The three simplifications above only impact the evaluation of risk-related network measures. In this way, network structure measures are independent of such assumptions as they deal exclusively with the bilateral exposures between countries in the network.

To analyze the network structure perspective, we construct a network that focuses on the gross investment and borrowing operations of countries. This perspective is useful to investigate how the investment and borrowing strategies of each country contribute to the overall network structural characteristics. Therefore, we model this dimension using the assets (investment) matrix $A$.

To analyze the risk buildup due to the interconnectedness of countries, we employ measures that explicitly take into account their loss absorbing characteristics\footnote{It is known that network topology can influence the overall risk of a financial system (Acemoglu et al. (2015); Battiston et al. (2016); de Souza et al. (2016); Silva et al. (2015b)). However, these works focus on domestic financial networks or toy networks that assume topological characteristics of the latter. We here instead attempt to describe the global financial network.}. The assets matrix $A$ of the first approach does not convey the notion of the counterparty risk that the
lender side assumes. That is, the absolute value of the operation may not indicate the true riskiness of that operation. For instance, we may have a situation in which banks lend very large amounts of money and they still can absorb the losses from those transactions if the corresponding borrowers default. In contrast, we may have operations that banks lend small amounts, but cannot withstand the losses if the borrowers do not pay. The vulnerability matrix $V$ accounts for this feature and is evaluated as:

$$V_{ij} = \min \left( \frac{A_{ij}}{B_i}, 1 \right),$$

which quantifies the vulnerability of $j$ with respect to the funding dependence on $i$, $B_i$ indicates the readily available resources or capital buffer of country $i \in \mathcal{V}$. Note that $V_{ij} \in [0, 1]$. Larger values of $V_{ij}$ indicate that $i$ is more vulnerable to $j$. Hence, it is more prone of defaulting should $j$ defaults. In the binary version of the vulnerability matrix, Silva et al. (2015b) show that it captures the potential contagious paths that may arise due to counterparty risks. For instance, an edge linking countries $i$ to $j$ in the binary vulnerability matrix reveals that $j$ can default in a domino-like effect in case $i$ does not honor its liabilities toward $j$. In the continuous version, just like (1), values of $V_{ij}$ in-between 0 and 1 indicate that $i$ gets stressed but does not default should $j$ defaults. In view of its generality, we opt to use the continuous version of the vulnerability matrix in this paper.

We classify the network measures in accordance with the main information they extract from the network—structure or risk aspect—as follows:

- **Structure aspect**: degree, strength, density, assortativity, clustering coefficient, dominance, and reciprocity.

- **Risk aspect**: criticality and vulnerability.

In addition, we analyze the dynamics of the network using the network persistence measure. Unlike the others, this indicator looks at the history of the network evolution and hence requires more than one network snapshot to be computed.

In the next sections, we review the network measurements that we use to extract topological information from the global financial network. For thorough reviews, see Silva and Zhao (2016).

### 3.1 Degree

The degree or valency of a vertex $i \in \mathcal{V}$, indicated by $k_i$, is related to its connectivity, or number of links (edges), to the remainder of the network $\mathcal{V}$. In directed graphs, this
notion can be further extended to the in-degree, \( k_i^{\text{(in)}} \), and out-degree, \( k_i^{\text{(out)}} \), such as the identity \( k_i = k_i^{\text{in}} + k_i^{\text{out}} \) holds.

The out- and in-degree of vertex \( i \in \mathcal{V} \) are defined as follows:

\[
k_i^{\text{(out)}} \triangleq \sum_{j \in \mathcal{V}} \mathbb{I}\{A_{ij} > 0\},
\]
\[
k_i^{\text{(in)}} \triangleq \sum_{j \in \mathcal{V}} \mathbb{I}\{A_{ji} > 0\},
\]

in which \( \mathbb{I}\{K\} \) represents the indicator function that yields 1 if \( K \), a logical expression, is true, and 0, otherwise. In the network of exposures analyzed in this paper, we define the out-degree \( k_i^{\text{(out)}} \) as the number of countries in which participant \( i \) has invested (is exposed to), and the in-degree \( k_i^{\text{(in)}} \) as the number of participants that are funding \( i \) in the market (they are exposed to \( i \)). In this paper, we interpret in- and out-degree of a vertex as measures of diversification of funding and investment counterparties.

3.2 Strength

The strength of a vertex \( i \in \mathcal{V} \), indicated by \( s_i \), represents the total sum of weighted connections of \( i \) towards its neighbors. Likewise the degree, the notion of strength can be further decomposed into the in-strength, \( s_i^{\text{(in)}} \), and out-strength, \( s_i^{\text{(out)}} \), such that the identity \( s_i = s_i^{\text{in}} + s_i^{\text{out}} \) holds. The feasible values of \( s_i \) corresponds to the continuous interval \([0, \infty)\).

The out- and in-strength of vertex \( i \in \mathcal{V} \) are defined as:

\[
s_i^{\text{(out)}} \triangleq \sum_{j \in \mathcal{V}} A_{ij},
\]
\[
s_i^{\text{(in)}} \triangleq \sum_{j \in \mathcal{V}} A_{ji}.
\]

In a network of exposures, the out-degree represents the amount of money that a country has invested in that market, providing a measure of total exposure or dependence of that country to the market. As the out-strength of an institution increases, it is more exposed to risk materialization events in that market. In contrast, the in-degree symbolizes the amount of money an country has received from players of that market segment. As the in-strength of an entity grows larger, its repayments failures become potentially more harmful to the market.
3.3 Density

The network density \( D \), also known as network connectivity, for a directed network, is defined as:

\[
D \equiv \frac{E}{\left(\frac{N}{2}\right)} = \frac{2E}{N(N-1)},
\]  

where \( N \) and \( E \) represent the total number of vertices and edges, respectively. The density assumes values in the interval \([0, 1]\). When \( D = 0 \), we say that the network \( \mathcal{V} \) is represented by an empty graph. Conversely, when \( D = 1 \), \( \mathcal{V} \) is said to be a complete network. Often in the literature, networks can also be classified as sparse, when \( D \) assumes values near 0, and dense, otherwise. As a rule of thumb, when the number of edges in the network is of the order of the number of vertices, i.e., \( E = \mathcal{O}(N) \), the network is considered sparse.

3.4 Assortativity

Assortativity is a network-level measure that, in a structural sense, quantifies the tendency of vertices to link with similar vertices in a network. The assortativity coefficient \( r \) is computed as the Pearson’s correlation of degrees of the vertices in each connected pair. Positive values of \( r \) indicate that network’s pairs of vertices have vertices in the endpoints with similar degrees, while negative values indicate endpoints with different degrees (Newman (2003)). In general, \( r \in [-1, 1] \). When \( r = 1 \), the network has perfect assortative mixing patterns, while, it is completely disassortative in the case \( r = -1 \). According to Silva and Zhao (2012a,b, 2015), understanding the assortative mixing patterns in complex networks is important for interpreting vertex functionality and for analyzing the global properties of the networks’ components. Considering that \( i_u \) and \( j_u \) represent the degrees of vertices \( i \) and \( j \), that are origin and destination of the \( u \)-th edge of a non-empty graph, respectively, and that \( \mathcal{E} \) is the set of edges and \( E = |\mathcal{E}| \) is the quantity of edges, the assortativity \( r \) is evaluated as follows (Newman (2002)):

\[
r \equiv \frac{\frac{1}{E} \sum_{u \in \mathcal{E}} i_u j_u - \left[ \frac{1}{2E} \sum_{u \in \mathcal{E}} (i_u + j_u) \right]^2}{\frac{1}{2E} \sum_{u \in \mathcal{E}} (i_u^2 + j_u^2) - \left[ \frac{1}{2E} \sum_{u \in \mathcal{E}} (i_u + j_u) \right]^2}.
\]

3.5 Clustering coefficient

The clustering coefficient is a measure of the extended degree to which vertices in a graph tend to cluster together. It quantifies the number of loops of order three (transitiv-
The weighted clustering coefficient of a vertex $i \in \mathcal{V}$ is given by (Barthélemy et al. (2005)):

$$CC_i \triangleq \frac{1}{s_i(k_i - 1)} \sum_{j,k \in \mathcal{V}} \frac{W_{ij} + W_{ik}}{2} \mathbb{1}_{\{W_{ij}W_{ik}W_{jk} > 0\}}, \quad (8)$$

in which $CC_i \in [0, 1]$; $W_{ij}$ is the edge weight from $i$ to $j$. Note that a triangular structure of edges must exist between $i$, $j$, and $k$, otherwise the term $\mathbb{1}_{\{W_{ij}W_{ik}W_{jk} > 0\}}$ yields zero. When $CC_i \rightarrow 1$, vertex $i$ presents dense topological structures in the vicinities in the sense of triangular modules. In contrast, when $CC_i \rightarrow 0$, it only contains sparse structures, possibly with long linear chains of vertices.

In this paper, we compute directed clustering coefficients using borrowing and lending perspectives. From the borrowing perspective, the edge weights in (8) are set to $W_{ij} = L_{ij} = A_{ji}$, the strength $s_i$ is set to $s_i^{(\text{in})}$, and the degree $k_i$ is fixed to $k_i^{(\text{in})}$. From the lending perspective, we fix $W_{ij} = A_{ij}$, $s_i = s_i^{(\text{out})}$, and $k_i = k_i^{(\text{out})}$.

A large $CC_i$ means that the neighbors $j$ and $k$ that form triangles with country $i$ can easily substitute $i$ in normal times. This fact is true because $j$ and $k$ are already interconnected due to the triangle with $i$ in the other endpoint. Thus, $j$ can potentially move its financial operations that it had with $i$ to its other neighbor $k$, and vice versa. Note that this reasoning only applies in normal times, i.e., when the network slightly or does not change. When $CC_i$ is small, few options are available for the neighbors $j$ and $k$ of $i$, implying that country $i$ is important in the neighborhood because its removal would drastically reduce the investment or funding alternatives of $j$ and $k$. Consequently, $CC_i$ can also be seen as a measure of the potential diversification of the counterparties of $i$.

The feasible space in the indicator function $W_{ij}W_{ik}W_{jk} > 0$ in (8) is very broad and will take into consideration triangles whose edges are composed of financial operations with small amounts. From a substitutability viewpoint, the existence of weak triangles between financial institutions $i$, $j$, and $k$ would not necessarily make them substitutable from one another. Weak triangles mean that these financial institutions do consider as main counterparties one another in investment and borrowing decisions; thus relationship lending would not hold. In contrast, if they form a strong triangle, they are representative and important counterparties to one another possibly due to relationship lending. Therefore, the stronger the triangles are, the stronger the substitutability between one another will be.

To account for that observation, we propose a truncated weighted clustering coefficient in which only triangles that are stronger than a triangle-dependent threshold $\sigma_{ijk}$ as follows:
\[ \hat{C}_i(\sigma) \triangleq \frac{1}{s_i(k_i - 1)} \sum_{j,k \in \mathcal{V}} \frac{W_{ij} + W_{ik}}{2} \mathbb{1}\{W_{ij}W_{ik}W_{jk} > \sigma_{ijk}\}, \]  

in which \( \hat{C}_i \) represents the truncated clustering coefficient of institution \( i \) and \( \sigma \) is a three dimensional matrix \( N^3 \) that carries the triangle-dependent thresholds, in which \( N \) is the number of vertices. Matrix \( \sigma \) must be symmetrical in the three orientations, so that \( \sigma_{ijk} = \sigma_{kij} = \sigma_{jki} \) holds.

Given a fixed weighted clustering coefficient, the larger \( \sigma_{ijk}, \forall i,j,k \in \mathcal{V} \), is, the stronger will be the substitutability property in-between them.

### 3.6 Dominance

The dominance of vertex \( i \in \mathcal{V}, D_i \), measures the relative importance of \( i \) on its neighbors’ operations. The dominance of \( i \) as a lender and as a borrower is given by:

\[
D_i^{(\text{lender})} \triangleq \sum_{j \in \mathcal{V}} \frac{A_{ij}}{s_j^{(\text{in})}},
\]

\[
D_i^{(\text{borrower})} \triangleq \sum_{j \in \mathcal{V}} \frac{A_{ji}}{s_j^{(\text{out})}},
\]

i.e., the lender dominance of \( i \) evaluates the fraction of funding to be received by \( i \)'s neighborhood, while the borrower dominance of \( i \) captures the fraction received by \( i \) against the total amount invested in the market by its neighbors. If vertex \( i \) is dominant, then it will be responsible for a large fraction of the funding or investment portfolios, respectively, of its neighborhood. Conversely, if it not dominant, these fractions will be, in general, small, resulting in low values for \( D_i^{(\text{lender})} \) and \( D_i^{(\text{borrower})} \). The removal of dominant countries may cause large impacts on their direct neighbors, as they play a central role in their funding or investment operations.

### 3.7 Reciprocity

The existence of mutual connections between pairs of vertex, or link reciprocity, in directed networks has received an increasing attention in recent years Garlaschelli and Loffredo (2004); Zlatic and Stefancic (2011). We highlight that reciprocity is crucial to classifying and modeling directed networks, to understanding the effects of network structure on dynamical processes, such as diffusion or percolation processes, and to also explaining patterns of growth in out-of-equilibrium networks Garlaschelli and Loffredo.
Reciprocity quantifies the information that we lose by projecting a directed network into an undirected network: if the reciprocity of the original network is maximum, then we can compute the inverse transformation using a lossless procedure. In contrast, no reciprocity implies a maximum uncertainty about the directionality of the original links that have been converted into undirected ones. The inverse transformation, therefore, attains maximum projection error.

If we have a binary network, then the reciprocity only captures the existence or absence of links. That is, $A_{ij} \in \{0, 1\}$. Mathematically, the network reciprocity fraction $R^{(\text{binary})} \in [0, 1]$ in binary networks with no self-loops is:

$$R^{(\text{binary})} \triangleq \frac{1}{V(V-1)} \sum_{i,j \in V} A_{ij}A_{ji},$$  \hspace{1cm} (12)$$
in which the terms inside the summation term only yield 1 in case $A_{ij} = A_{ji} = 1$, and 0 otherwise. Equation (12), thus, counts the number of mutual pairwise connections.

Now we consider reciprocity in weighted networks, i.e. $A_{ij} \in \mathbb{R}$. While the reciprocity of binary networks has been widely investigated, that of weighted networks has received much less attention, due to its more complicated phenomenology at the dyadic level (Squartini et al. (2013)). Given two mutual links between vertices $i$ and $j$, $A_{ij}$ and $A_{ji}$, we can always decompose the pair $(A_{ij}, A_{ji})$ of reciprocal links into a bidirectional (fully reciprocated) interaction, plus a unidirectional (non-reciprocated) interaction. With this respect, we express the reciprocated weight between $i$ and $j$ as:

$$A_{ij}^{\leftrightarrow} \triangleq A_{ji}^{\leftrightarrow} \triangleq \min\{A_{ij}, A_{ji}\},$$  \hspace{1cm} (13)$$
and the non-reciprocated part from that pair of links as:

$$A_{ij}^{\rightarrow} \triangleq A_{ji}^{\rightarrow} = \max\{A_{ij}, A_{ji}\} - A_{ij}^{\leftrightarrow}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (14)$$
Denote $W$ as the total amount of operations inside the network, i.e.

$$W \triangleq \sum_{i \in V} s_i^{(\text{out})} = \sum_{i \in V} s_i^{(\text{in})},$$  \hspace{1cm} (15)$$
and the total reciprocated network weight as:
\[ W^{\leftrightarrow} \triangleq \sum_{i,j \in V} A_{ij}^{\leftrightarrow}, \]  \hspace{1cm} (16) 

then, the network weighted reciprocity \( R^{\text{weighted}} \in [0, 1] \) is (Squartini et al. (2013)):

\[ R^{\text{weighted}} \triangleq \frac{W^{\leftrightarrow}}{W}. \]  \hspace{1cm} (17) 

If all of the monetary fluxes are perfectly reciprocated, then \( R^{\text{weighted}} = 1 \), whereas in absence of reciprocation, then \( R^{\text{weighted}} = 0 \).

In financial networks, the occurrence of reciprocity in the risk domain contributes to increasing the speed of contagion due to extended neighborhoods. Consider Fig. 3 in which vertices \( i \) and \( j \) share mutual links. Recall that a link from vertex \( i \) to \( j \) exist in the vulnerability matrix when the default of \( i \) leads \( j \) into default as well. Due to the reciprocity, we effectively have an extension of the neighborhood from \( i \) and \( j \). For instance, if \( i \) defaults, it can potentially lead 1, 2, and \( j \) into default. However, the default of \( j \) leads 3 and 4 into default as well. Thus, in the risk perspective, the neighborhood of \( i \) extends to also include 3 and 4. The same reasoning applies to the neighborhood of \( j \).

![Figure 3: Schematic of the extended neighborhood phenomenon in the risk domain (vulnerability matrix) when reciprocity is present.](image)

### 3.8 Criticality

The criticality of the country \( i \in V, C_i \), quantifies the impact of \( i \)'s liabilities toward its counterparties’ liquid assets. That is, the criticality computes the sum of the vulnerabilities of country \( i \)'s creditors. Mathematically, it is given by:
where \( V_{ji} \) is the vulnerability from \( j \) to \( i \), which we evaluate using \( (1) \). Recall that \( B_j \) indicates the readily available resources or capital buffer of bank \( j \in V \). We can conceive the criticality \( C_i \) as a quasi-local measure that quantifies how vulnerable the direct neighbors of \( i \) are if \( i \) does not honor its debts. In the risk domain, we can compute \( C_i \) as the in-degree of vertex \( i \) in the vulnerability matrix. Note that, in the spectrum of the criticality, the local importance of a country is not directly related to its size; rather, it is represented by its creditors’ vulnerabilities, measured by their gross liabilities to capital buffer ratios.

3.9 Network persistence

One way to evaluate the network dynamics is by analyzing how the network links change over time. In this work, we evaluate how the network state evolves for different memory windows. Given a network trajectory \( \mathcal{T} = \{W(1), \ldots, W(t)\} \), in which \( W(t) \) denotes the (weighted) adjacency matrix of the financial network at instant \( t \), we can evaluate the network persistence with memory length \( \tau > 0 \) at the reference time \( T \in \{1, \ldots, t\} \), \( P_{\tau}(T) \), as follows:

\[
P_{\tau}(T) = \frac{1}{N(N-1)} \sum_{i,j \in \mathcal{V}} \mathbb{1}_{\{\bigcap_{t=1}^{\tau} W_{ij}(t) = W_{ij}(T)\}}
\]

(19)

In (19), we first fix a network snapshot at the reference time \( T, W(T) \). Afterwards, we walk through the previous network snapshots \( W(t-1), \ldots, W(t-\tau) \) and compare each link \( (i, j), i, j \in \mathcal{V} \), of the reference snapshot, \( W_{ij}(T) \), with that of the previous snapshots \( W_{ij}(t-i) \), \( i \in \{1, \ldots, \tau\} \). If, in these computations, the state of the link at the reference time changes in at least one of the previous snapshots, we declare it as a non-persistent, volatile link. Now, if the state of the link at the reference time perfectly matches that of all of the previous network snapshots, we declare it as a persistent link. When \( P_{\tau}(T) = 1 \), we say that the network state has not changed since at least \( \tau \) periods, i.e. the network is perfectly persistent within that time frame. Conversely, when \( P_{\tau}(T) = 0 \), links do not persist within the time frame of width \( \tau \), hence the network is unstable and volatile. The outer constant accounts for normalizing \( P_{\tau}(T) \) and assumes that self-loops are not allowed.

In this work, we define two states for a link: either absent or present. However,
given that the edge weight carries a monetary quantity, we stress that we could also discretize that continuous interval in non-overlapping regions. We would then measure link volatility by transitions from one region to another one. As a smoothness assumption, we could give different penalization weights depending on how far we jump from region to region. When this jump goes from two regions very distant from each other, we could penalize more than transitions going from adjacent regions.

In financial networks, the existence of persistent links between pairs of institutions may indicate preference attachment due to relationship lending or better contractual conditions in relation to the current market picture. Unstablness may arise due to reclassification of the counterparty; external events, such as defaults that may force market players to perform reallocation strategies; among others.

4 Results

In this section, we analyze the global financial network topology using network measures that systematically capture its topological and risk aspects.

4.1 Degree

Figures 4a and 4b present the average in- and out-degrees of groups of reporting countries. The USA has the most diversified investment (out-degree) and funding (in-degree) portfolios. It invests in all of the reporting countries throughout the entire period, whereas its funding portfolio becomes more diversified from 2005 to 2014. We verify the same trend, for funding portfolios, for all of the groups in the sample. However, the investment portfolio diversification trends differ according to the countries group. While Oceanian and Asian countries tend to assume more diversified investment positions, European and Latin American countries + Canada, on average, seem to reduce the diversification of their investment portfolios along time.

4.2 Strength

Recall that the in- and out-strength account for the monetary amount that is being borrowed from or lent to in the exposure network. Figures 1f and 1e show the countries groups average in- and out-strength. We note that after the USA, which holds the largest amounts of funding operations in the exposure network, European countries, on average, receive the largest funding operations in this market, followed by Oceanian and Asian countries, and finally Latin America countries and Canada.

With regard to the total amount invested in network, we see that all of the reporting countries, on average, show increasing participation in the international market, except
for European countries, whose total investment amounts significantly decreases after the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. The USA shows a vertiginous increase in the total amount invested in the international market that begins at the quarter of failure of the Lehman Brothers. This quick increase may also be related to the Quantitative Easing 1 (QE 1) program launched in late November 2008, in which the Federal Reserve started buying US$ 600 billion in mortgage-backed securities. The large increase in the USA out-
strength may have been caused by a financial agents confidence crisis, that led them to invest part of the liquidity amounts injected by the Federal Reserve in foreign accounts. In contrast, in November 2010, the Fed announced the Quantitative Easing 2 (QE 2) program, buying US$ 600 billion of treasury securities by the end of the second quarter of 2011. This liquidity injection did result in a significant increase of the USA out-strength, though smaller than that of QE 1 program.

4.3 Density

Figure 4c shows the network densities computed according to different filtering criteria. We present the density for the full network and also for partial networks that are constructed using filters over the edge weights (amount that is lent) between reporting countries. We inform the density for partial networks that only present operations greater than: 1, 10, and 100 billion. The full cross-border exposure network is dense, as about 90% of the possible connections exist, partly due to the sample of countries that we are using in our analysis: G10 participants and some emergent markets countries. Almost half of the active operations are of amounts smaller than US$ 1 billion. Moreover, we see that about 10% of the active operations reach amounts greater than US$ 100 billion.

Figure 5: Evolution of the network density in the risk (vulnerability matrix) dimension for the BIS CBS data set.

Figure 5 displays the density of the vulnerability network. Despite the original cross- border exposure network presenting a very dense structure (recall Fig. 4c), the corresponding vulnerability network is perceptibly sparse. Note that, as the vulnerability network gets denser, it is an indicative of a potentially more fragile financial system, in that more exposures exist that may lead to default creditors in their financial operations. We see that the network is potentially more fragile in-between 2007 and 2008, period
that coincides with the global financial crisis. We also observe that, from March 2005 to
the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, the trajectory of the vulnerability network
density assumes a consistent upward trend. After 2008, it rapidly drops down to a quasi-
plateau, fluctuating around the 7% mark.

4.4 Assortativity

Figure 4d shows the network assortativity. We first note that the cross-border ex-
posure network presents a slight disassortative mixing pattern, suggesting that countries
with small number of active operations tend to connect to others with several operations,
and vice versa. We highlight that, although the global financial network built up from
the relationships between the reporting countries only indicate a small disassortative pat-
tern, this feature contrasts with several works that analyze domestic interbank networks or
payments systems and conclude for the existence of strong disassortative patterns (Cas-
тро Miranda et al. (2014); Souza et al. (2015)). The difference might arise because of the
nature of the financial systems: while the analyzed global network has dense topological
structures due to the high activity of its members (G10 and emergent countries), those
domestic networks are very sparse, with a significant number of entities connected to a
few money centers. A high network density increases the chances of pairs of countries
with similar degree to connect to each other, thus incrementing the network assortativity.

The network assortativity shows an interesting behavior: although with a global
downward tendency, there is a peak occurring in 2008 that coincides with the global
financial crisis. In that region, the network becomes slightly more assortative, suggesting
that similar pairs of countries connected to each other.

4.5 Clustering coefficient

Figures 4e and 4f present the average clustering coefficients of the discussed coun-
tries groups in the borrowing and lending perspectives. In the borrowing perspective,
the clustering coefficient of the USA remains roughly constant until June 2008, time in
which it starts to steadily decrease, until March 2010, when it begins to decrease in a
more slowly pace. In the lending perspective, its clustering coefficient shows opposite
behavior: it remains in a low-valued plateau until June 2008, date in which it consistently
increases until it reaches another steady threshold in March 2010. A high clustering co-
efficient suggests that, given two arbitrary neighbors of a reference country, it is likely
that they will be interconnected as well. In view of that, before the failure of Lehman
Brothers, we see that two arbitrary creditors of the USA, on average, are very likely to
maintain active operations as well. However, two of its debtors, on average, are not likely
to be interconnected. From the figures, we see that this situation reverses after March
2010. In the in-between period of June 2008 to March 2010, a transition from the first to the second scenario occurs: pairs of USA cross-border creditors become less likely to interconnect and debtors, more likely.

European countries, on average, show downward and upward trends for the borrowing and lending perspectives clustering coefficients, respectively. Latin American, Oceanian, Asian countries and Canada exhibit roughly constant values for the clustering coefficient.

The clustering coefficient can be interpreted as a level of substitutability of countries. The higher the clustering coefficient, the easier it is to substitute a country by its counterparties, as they are likely to be interconnected between themselves as well. In the non-truncated version of the clustering coefficient, the USA tend to become less substitutable in the borrowing side, but more easily substitutable in the lending side. European countries show a similar behavior. Finally, the level of substitutability of Latin American, Oceanian, Asian countries and Canada, on average, seem to not change significantly in the studied period.

In the non-truncated version of the clustering coefficient, recall that weak triangles are considered in the computation. Therefore, substitutability between members of the same triangle may be compromised as relationship lending is unlikely to be shared between the members of that triangle. Therefore, substituting one counterparty to another may be costly, in a way that substitutability does not hold anymore. To solve this problem, we have designed a truncated version of the clustering coefficient, so that we only consider in the computation triangles \((i, j, k)\) that are stronger than a given triangle-dependent threshold \(\sigma_{ijk}\). We consider two versions for truncating the triangle strengths: i) a uniform truncation point that is established using the average connection weight in the network, and ii) a triangle-dependent truncation point that depends on the observed average investment that each country in the triangle perform in the network.

In the first approach, we assume that \(\sigma = \sigma_{ijk}, \forall i, j, k \in \mathcal{V}\), and is of the form \((\alpha \bar{w})^3\), \(\forall i, j, k \in \mathcal{V}\). The term \(\alpha \in \mathbb{R}_+\) is a constant that modulates the average link weight in the network \(\bar{w}\), which in turn is given by:

\[
\bar{w} = \frac{1}{E_{>0}} \sum_{i,j \in \mathcal{V}} A_{ij},
\]

in which \(E_{>0}\) denotes the number of links in the network.

Figure 6 portrays the truncated clustering coefficient for the borrowing and lending perspectives, respectively, for three values of \(\alpha \in \{0.5, 1, 1.5\}\). One perceptible different on the borrowing clustering coefficient of European countries: while in the non-truncated version they show large values, suggesting that they are easily substitutable counterpar-
ties, in the truncated version, they assume very small values. Therefore, though European countries have financial operations with neighbors that are mostly interconnected, these triangles are not strong. In the lending perspective, in contrast, the European countries form strong triangles with their counterparties. Thus, European countries are easily substitutable in the lending perspective, but not in the borrowing perspective. The USA has strong triangles formed both in the borrowing and lending perspectives.

In the second approach, we consider triangle-dependent truncation points of the form \( \sigma_{ijk} = \alpha \bar{s}^{(\text{in})}_{ijk} \) for the borrowing perspective and \( \sigma_{ijk} = \alpha \bar{s}^{(\text{out})}_{ijk} \) for the lending perspective. The terms \( \bar{s}^{(\text{in})}_{ijk} \) and \( \bar{s}^{(\text{out})}_{ijk} \) stand as the average funding and investment, respectively, of the triangle composed of countries \( i, j, \) and \( k \). In the lending perspective, we compute \( \bar{s}^{(\text{out})}_{ijk} \) as follows:

\[
\bar{s}^{(\text{out})}_{ijk} = \bar{s}^{(\text{out})}_i \bar{s}^{(\text{out})}_j \bar{s}^{(\text{out})}_k, \tag{21}
\]

in which:

\[
\bar{s}^{(\text{out})}_i = \frac{s^{(\text{out})}_i}{k^{(\text{out})}_i}. \tag{22}
\]

To compute the triangle-dependent truncation matrix \( \sigma \in \mathcal{V}^3 \), we can perform the following mathematical operation over the vector \( \bar{s}^{(\text{out})} = [\bar{s}^{(\text{out})}_1, \bar{s}^{(\text{out})}_2, \ldots, \bar{s}^{(\text{out})}_V]^T \):

\[
\sigma = \bar{s}^{(\text{out})} \otimes (\bar{s}^{(\text{out})})^T \otimes \bar{s}^{(\text{out})}, \tag{23}
\]

and reshape the matrix accordingly to the dimension \( \mathcal{V}^3 \). The symbol \( \otimes \) is the Kronecker product. In this way, \( \sigma_{ijk} \) denotes the triangle strength of countries \( i, j, \) and \( k \).

Figure 7 portrays the triangle-dependent truncated clustering coefficient for the borrowing and lending perspectives, respectively, for three values of \( \alpha \in \{0.5^3, 1, 1.5^3\} \). In the borrowing perspective, we see that European countries have small truncated clustering coefficients in the first approach, while in the second, they assume larger values. In this respect, we can conclude that triangles that European countries form in the borrowing perspective with their neighbors have strength values that are lower than the average triangle strength in the international claims network. However, these triangles are formed with strength values that are higher than the average funding each of the members in the

\footnote{To compute the quantities in the borrowing perspective, we just need to exchange out-strength to in-strength and out-degree to in-degree.}
triangle has. In respect to the lending approach, we see an opposite view for the European countries: the formed triangles have strength values higher than the average triangle strength in the network. However, these values are below the average lending of each participant in the triangles with European countries. In summary, while European countries establish strong triangles in the lending perspective, the triangles in the borrowing

Figure 6: Evolution of truncated weighted clustering coefficients both in the borrowing (left panel) and lending (right panel) perspectives. We consider three truncation points $\sigma \in \{ (0.5 \bar{w})^3, \bar{w}^3, (1.5 \bar{w})^3 \}$, in which $\bar{w}$ stands as the average link weight of the network conditional on links that are present.
perspective are weak in relation to the average network connection.

Figure 7: Evolution of truncated weighted clustering coefficients both in the borrowing (left panel) and lending (right panel) perspectives. We consider triangle-dependent truncation points \( \sigma_{ijk} = 0.5 \bar{s}_{ijk} \) (a), \( \sigma = 0.5 \bar{s}_{out} \) (b), \( \sigma = \bar{s}_{out} \) (c), \( \sigma = 1.5 \bar{s}_{out} \) (d), \( \sigma = 1.5 \bar{s}_{out} \) (e), and \( \sigma = 1.5 \bar{s}_{out} \) (f). For robustness, we use \( \alpha \in \{0.5^3, 1, 1.5^3\} \).
4.6 Dominance

Figures 8a and 8b exhibit the average dominance as borrowers and lenders, respectively, for the countries groups. The dominance as borrower for all of the countries groups, on average, seems to be roughly constant over the studied period. In contrast, we verify that the dominance as lender of the USA shows three clear regions: a) until June 2008: it steadily decreases; b) from June 2008 until December 2009: it largely increases; and c) from December 2009 onwards: it slowly increases. The rapid increase in the second region may be due to the large outflow of investments performed by the USA after the failure of the Lehman Brothers. (Recall the behavior of the out-strength in Fig. 1e)

European countries, on average, seem to lose importance as lenders in the studied period, while Oceanian and Asian countries have increasing dominance values in the lending perspective. The importance as lenders in the international claims network of Latin American countries and the Canada, however, seems to remain constant.

Figure 8: Evolution of the average dominance computed for the lender and borrowing perspectives for members of the international claims network constructed from the reported data taken from the BIS CBS.

4.7 Reciprocity

Figures 9a and 9b depict the binary and weighted network reciprocity values for the assets matrix (investment dimension). In the other dimension, Figure 9c shows the binary network reciprocity evaluated in the vulnerability matrix (risk dimension). In the investment dimension, we see an increasing upward trend both in the binary and weighted network reciprocity. Interestingly, large part of the network connections are mutual. In the risk dimension, we observe two behaviors in the curve denoting the network reciprocity. From March 2005 to June 2008, we see an upward trend in vulnerability network reciprocity, showing the increase in mutual vulnerability connections between pairs of
countries. This behavior is consistent with the increase in the vulnerability network density depicted in Fig.5, which suggests the increase in the number of possible contagion routes in the global financial network. As we have seen, the reciprocity of members in the risk domain effectively causes an extension of direct neighborhoods of both members that share mutual connections. We see a large buildup in the number of established mutual connections in the period previous to the crisis. After the default of the Lehman Brothers, we observe a large decrease in the number of reciprocal links in the vulnerability domain.

Figure 9: Evolution of the binary and weighted reciprocity evaluated both from the investment (assets matrix) and risk (vulnerability matrix) dimensions for the BIS CBS data set. The vulnerability matrix is naturally binary, therefore the weighted and binary reciprocity indices are the same.

4.8 Criticality

Figure 10 portrays the average criticality for the countries groups. The criticality measure seems to increase until the global financial crisis, after which it starts to decrease for all of the reporting countries in the studied period. In addition, we see that the USA is the most critical country, followed by European countries, then Oceanian and Asian
countries, and finally Latin American countries and Canada. In June 2008, while the criticality of the USA practically remains constant, we see a strong structural break for all of the other reporting countries. The downward trend of the criticality measure occurs due to two factors: i) the abrupt decrease of total operations performed in the global financial market after the global financial crisis (cf. Fig. 1a) and ii) the increasing capitalization of banks (see Fig. 2). Even though the criticality of the USA seems to reduce at a slow pace, we verify that the number of countries that invest on it consistently increases in the analyzed period (recall Fig. 4a), suggesting that there is a trend in which the vulnerability of the USA creditors reasonably decreases.

![Figure 10: Evolution of the average criticality evaluated for members of the international claims network constructed from the reported data taken from the BIS CBS.](image)

### 4.9 Network persistence

Figures 11a and 11b depict the network persistence for the assets and vulnerability matrices, respectively. We assess the persistence using four memory lengths: connections or link states lasting at least one quarter, one, two and four years. The respective curves start at different points in time because we need to check for the state persistence in previous periods equal to the number of the respective memory length.

In the assets matrix, we see a large investment persistence in the network with a perceivable increasing trend. We also note that banks over different countries establish long-term links, as the investment persistence decays very slowly as we increase the memory length of the persistence. In contrast, the vulnerability persistence has two regions:

---

6Recall that as one country has more and more neighbors, the tendency of the criticality is to get larger and larger, as there is no normalization in its evaluation (see (18)). The contrasting point in the USA here is that, as the number of neighbors in the USA gets larger, its criticality still seems to be reducing. This natural tendency is effectively broken by smaller vulnerability indices of each of its neighbors.
one after and one before the global financial crisis. Before the crisis, we see a consistent buildup in the vulnerability persistence, suggesting that, even though banks were very exposed to others in relation to their capability of absorbing losses, due to the optimistic global scenario, they kept maintaining these risky financial operations in the network. The scenario drastically changed after the global financial crisis onset. We verify a rapid decrease in the vulnerability network persistence, showing that banks attempt to avoid long-term risky positions in the global market. After 2013, however, we see a large increase in the vulnerability network persistence for operations with duration of, at least, one quarter. The same persistence pattern occurs with long-term operations, but in a more moderate manner.

![Investment and Vulnerability Persistence Charts](a) Investment persistence (b) Vulnerability persistence

Figure 11: Evolution of the network persistence evaluated both from the investment (assets matrix) and risk (vulnerability matrix) dimensions for the BIS CBS data set.

5 Conclusions

This paper employs complex network tools to evaluate the international cross-border financial markets across the globe. These measures can help evaluate not only which are the most relevant countries and banking systems but also how their degree of vulnerability changes over time. Overall, the most relevant country is the US, followed by European countries. The current framework allows for studying in a more comprehensive way how shocks to specific countries may spread to different countries and their potential for contagion.

Financial regulators may trigger policy reactions in situations where specific countries show a large degree of vulnerability. However, if the network is more vulnerable, it may call for a coordinated policy reaction from key players in the global financial market. Our results show that the global financial market was fragile before the onset of the crisis in 2008. Afterwards, fragility has been reduced to a lower disposition in assuming
risks. However, as financial systems and markets are normalized there may be a trend on increasing vulnerability, which should be an important concern for financial regulators.

It is soon to evaluate the impact of recent changes in financial regulation in the fragility of the global financial network. However, this is an important research question that has to be addressed and, with the help of complex networks, we can provide some insights on the topic. Further research should explore how different policies across the world may have changed the financial network topology and how they change systemic risk in specific countries and also worldwide.

References


Appendix A  Robustness analysis using the ultimate risk basis approach

In the main text, we have discussed about topological and risk-related network measures using as input the global banking market constructed from the immediate borrower basis approach. For robustness, in this section, we reapply the same methodology but taking as input the network constructed using the ultimate risk basis approach. Recall that the main difference of the two approaches is that, in the latter, edges emerge from the creditor that hold the final risk and not from the immediate counterparty.

We start by analyzing measures that focus on the network structure and hence do not take into account the risk dimension of countries, i.e. they do not use their loss absorbing capabilities.

Figures 12a and 12b present the average in- and out-degrees of groups of reporting countries. We see that the qualitative aspects of the in- and out-degree curves do not change with relation to the network constructed using the immediate borrower approach. In this regard, we still conclude that the USA has the most diversified investment (out-degree) and funding (in-degree) portfolios. In addition, we can verify that the USA invests in all of the reporting countries throughout the entire period, whereas its funding portfolio becomes more diversified from 2005 to 2014.

Figure 12c shows the network density that we compute using different filtering criteria. We present the density for the full network and also for partial networks that are constructed using filters over the edge weights (amount that is lent) between reporting countries. Likewise the main text, we inform the density for partial networks that only present operations greater than: 1, 10, and 100 billion. Again, the same qualitative results we have drawn from the network constructed using the immediate borrower approach can be extended to that built using the ultimate risk basis approach. A small quantitative difference, however, is notable. If look at the network density for operations that are over 100 billion, we can see filtered network corresponding to the ultimate basis risk approach is slightly denser than that reflecting the immediate borrower approach. This feature suggests that fewer countries are assuming the ultimate risk in the cross-border exposures for large-valued transactions.

Figure 12d portrays the network assortativity of the global banking system. Though the curves that correspond to the network assortativity differ using the immediate borrower and ultimate risk approaches, their qualitative feature remains unaltered. In this aspect, these networks present slight disassortative mixing pattern, in which the assortativity assumes values in the interval $[-0.20, -0.08]$ for the ultimate risk approach while the immediate borrower approach presents assortativity values in the interval $[-0.16, -0.10]$. The observed weak disassortative pattern of these networks may be related to their high
density: a higher network density increases the odds of connections between pairs of countries with similar degrees, which in turn forces increments in the assortativity.

Figures 12e and 12f present the average clustering coefficients in the borrowing and lending perspectives by groups of reporting countries. We see that the network structure in the surroundings of Latin American countries and the Canada is sparser when they act as
guarantors instead of being just the debtor counterparties. This fact suggests that creditors demand guarantors abroad so as to establish financial operations with these countries. In contrast, all of the remaining results are similar. For instance, we can again identify the constant clustering coefficient of the USA in the borrowing perspective during the second semester of 2008, time in which it starts to steadily decrease. In contrast, its clustering coefficient curve in the lending perspective has again two plateaus that are divided in the beginning of 2009.

We also report in Fig. 13 the truncated clustering coefficient in the borrowing and lending perspectives by groups of reporting countries, respectively, using truncation families of the form $(\alpha\bar{w})^3$, in which $\bar{w}$ is the average link weight in the network and $\alpha \in \{0.5, 1, 1.5\}$. Though the results on Latin American countries and Canada slight differ again, the qualitative results between the immediate borrower and ultimate risk approaches of the remainder of the countries seem to hold.

Figures 14a and 14b exhibit the average dominance as borrowers and lenders, respectively, by groups of reporting countries in the ultimate risk basis approach. Again, the results that we draw from the network constructed using the immediate borrower basis approach can be extended to that built using the ultimate risk basis approach.

Now we study the criticality measure that, unlike the previous indicators, focuses on the risk dimension that arises due to the pairwise exposures between countries. In this way, the information on the countries’ loss absorbing capabilities is crucial when computing this measure. Figure 15 portrays the average criticality for the countries groups. Just like the immediate borrower approach, we see that the average criticality seems to increase until the global financial crisis, after which it decreases for all of the reporting countries. We also conclude that the USA is the most critical country, followed by European countries, then Oceanian and Asian countries, and finally Latin American countries and Canada using the ultimate risk basis approach.

Figures 16a and 16b depict the binary and weighted network reciprocity values for the assets matrix (investment dimension). In the other dimension, Figure 16c shows the binary network reciprocity evaluated in the vulnerability matrix (risk dimension). We also verify that these curves resemble those that describe the network constructed using the immediate borrower basis approach. For instance, we again see an increasing upward trend both in the binary and weighted network reciprocity in the investment dimension, which may be related to more diversified portfolios of countries. In the risk dimension, we see a buildup in the link reciprocity during the pre-crisis period, with a downfall just after the default of the Lehman Brothers.

Figures 17a and 17b show the network persistence for the assets and vulnerability matrices, respectively. Just like in the main text, we assess the persistence using four memory lengths: connections or link states lasting at least one quarter, one, two and three
Figure 13: Robustness analysis using the ultimate risk basis approach. Evolution of truncated weighted clustering coefficients both in the borrowing (left panel) and lending (right panel) perspectives. We consider three truncation points $\sigma \in \{0.5\bar{w}^3, \bar{w}^3, 1.5\bar{w}^3\}$, in which $\bar{w}$ stands as the average link weight of the network conditional on links that are present.

years. The respective curves start at different points in time because we need to check for the state persistence in previous periods equal to the number of the respective memory length. We see the financial relations between creditor and guarantor are slightly more persistent that those between creditor and debtor during the crisis period. However, the behavior of the financial operation persistence in both the immediate borrower and uli-
Figure 14: Robustness analysis using the ultimate risk basis approach. Evolution of the average dominance computed for the lender and borrowing perspectives for members of the global banking system.

Figure 15: Robustness analysis using the ultimate risk basis approach. Evolution of the average criticality evaluated for members of the global banking system.

mate risk approaches remains qualitatively similar. In this aspect, we can identify in both approaches the existence of two regions in the vulnerability persistence between reporting countries: one after and one before the global financial crisis. We see a consistent buildup in the vulnerability persistence in the pre-crisis period with a sharp downfall after the default of the Lehman Brothers. After 2013, however, we again identify a considerable rise in the vulnerability network persistence for operations with lasting at least one quarter.
Figure 16: Robustness analysis using the ultimate risk basis approach. Evolution of the binary and weighted reciprocity evaluated both from the investment (assets matrix) and risk (vulnerability matrix) dimensions for members of the global banking system. The vulnerability matrix is naturally binary, therefore the weighted and binary reciprocity indices are the same.

Figure 17: Robustness analysis using the ultimate risk basis approach. Evolution of the network persistence evaluated both from the investment (assets matrix) and risk (vulnerability matrix) dimensions for members of the global banking system.