


# **Inflation Report**

December 19th, 2024

# **Diogo Abry Guillen**

BCB's Deputy Governor for Economic Policy





INFLATION REPORT (IR)

# Reference scenario

# Reference scenario

### **External scenario**


- The global environment remains challenging, due mainly to the economic outlook in the United States, which poses questions about the pace of economic deceleration, disinflation and, consequently, about the Fed's monetary policy stance.
- The central banks of major economies remain committed to bringing inflation back to its targets in a context characterized by labor market pressures.
- The Committee judges that the external environment continues to require caution from emerging market economies.

### **Economic activity**

• Regarding the domestic scenario, the set of indicators on economic activity and labor market continues to exhibit strength, as observed in the recent release of GDP, which suggests a further widening of the output gap.

### Inflation

- Headline inflation and measures of underlying inflation are above the inflation target and have increased in recent releases.
- Inflation expectations for 2024 and 2025 collected by the Focus survey increased significantly and hover around 4.8% and 4.6%, respectively.
- Copom's inflation projections for the second quarter of 2026, current relevant horizon for monetary policy, stand at 4.0% in the reference scenario.




INFLATION REPORT (IR)

# **Economic outlook**

External scenario


# **External outlook – Activity**

Global economic activity continues to show resilience notwithstanding the restrictive monetary policy stance. The labor market has shown clearer signs of accommodation in recent months, with a progressive rebalancing between supply and demand.



# 1/ Calculated as described in the box "Projections and macroeconomic analysis model of the global economy" in the September 2022 IR. 2/ Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.


### U.S. – Job openings and participation rate




Source: Bloomberg 1/ Until October 2024.

# **External scenario – Inflation**

In advanced economies, despite the decline in headline inflation indexes, cores are still at high levels, above the target in many economies, and their pace of convergence has decelerated at the margin.






### BANCO CENTRAL DO BRASIL

# External scenario – Inflation expectations in EME

Expectations indicate inflation within the interval around the target by the end of 2025 in major emerging market economies.




# External scenario – Monetary policy in EME

Expectations indicate, in general, lower interest rates than the current ones by the end of 2025 in major emerging market economies. Most central banks in advanced economies continue to ease their restrictive monetary policy stance.

# Policy interest rates % p.a. 18 12 6 BRA CHL COL MEX PER ZAF CZE HUN POL UKR RUS IND CHN IDN MYS PHL THA KOR Current data • Expect. 2024 • Expect. 2025

Sources: Bloomberg and central banks' surveys 1/ Until December 6.




Source: Bloomberg 1/ Until December 6.




# External scenario - Commodities and pressure indicators

Energy commodity prices registered a positive change in the quarter, with a slight increase in oil and a strong rise in natural gas.




### Change in commodity prices





Source: Bloomberg



INFLATION REPORT (IR)


# **Economic outlook**

Domestic outlook

Economic activity in Brazil remained dynamic in 2024Q3, leading to a new round of upward revisions to growth projections for the year.

### **Gross Domestic Product** 2019Q4 = 100, s.a. 112 -108 104 100 96 92 22 16 18 ----- Pre-pandemic maximum Pre-pandemic trend **GDP** Source: IBGE

### **Expectations for GDP growth**




Source: BCB (Focus)


The group of activities more sensitive to the economic cycle once again showed strong growth despite some deceleration.

Household consumption maintained robust growth in 2024Q3.

### **GDP – More and less cyclical sectors**



### GDP and household consumption




Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) continued to grow at a strong pace. The investment rate increased, but remains below the average level since 1996.


### **GDP** and **GFCF** 2022 = 100, s.a. 22 23 24 **GDP GFCF**

### Source: IBGE

# GFCF/GDP at 2019 prices



Available data suggest a new expansion in economic activity in 2024Q4, with no clear signs of a significant slowdown.



# **Projections for GDP growth in 2024 and 2025**

### **Gross domestic Product**

% growth

	2023	20	24 <sup>1/</sup>	2025 <sup>1/</sup>		
		IR Sep	IR Dez	IR Sep	IR Dec	
GDP at market prices	3,2	3,2	3,5	2,0	2,1	
Taxes on products	2,3	4,7	5,5	1,9	2,0	
Value added at basic prices	3,4	2,9	3,3	2,0	2,2	
Supply						
Agriculture and livestock	16,3	-1,6	-2,0	2,0	4,0	
Industry	1,7	3,5	3,3	2,4	2,4	
Services	2,8	3,2	3,8	1,9	1,9	
Demand						
Household consumption	3,2	4,5	5,3	2,2	2,4	
Government consumption	3,8	2,7	1,9	2,0	1,6	
Gross fixed capital formation	-3,0	5,5	7,3	2,0	2,9	
Exports	8,9	3,2	3,0	2,5	2,5	
Imports	-1,2	11,3	13,7	2,5	2,5	
Net trade contribution (p.p.)	2,0	-1,2	-1,6	0,0	0,0	

Sources: IBGE and BCB

1/ Estimates.

### 2024

- The GDP growth projection for 2024 grew from 3.2% to 3.5%.
- New positive surprise in 2024Q3 and the first indicators of 2024Q4 have led to a new round of upward revisions in the growth projection.
- The revision of the CNT series had little effect on the aggregate GDP, but it was important in changing the projection of some components.

### 2025

- Slight increase in the 2025 projection, from 2.0% to 2.1%.
- Positive contributions: higher expected growth for agriculture; and an increase in the statistical carry-over for 2025, mainly due to positive surprises in 2024Q3.
- Negative contribution: Expectation of a slower growth rate throughout the year, in a scenario of stronger monetary tightening.
- The perspective of lower growth in 2025 compared with 2024 remains.




# Interest, income, and consumption of durables and non-durables


- This box empirically evaluates the likely heterogeneity of the effects of interest rates and income on the consumption of durables and non-durables in the Brazilian economy.
- Model: Quarterly VAR at first difference estimate relating the real ex-ante Selic, restricted HGDNI, and consumption of nondurables and durables obtained by aggregating items from the PMC.

### Results:

- The response of durables to interest rates is higher than that of non-durables.
- The response to income is more alike between durables and non-durables, but still greater for durables.
- The decomposition of the forecast error variance shows that interest rate shocks are more important for the variance of durables. In turn, income shocks are more important for the consumption of non-durables.


### Response to shock in interest rates





### Response to shock in income

Response to a 1 p.p. shock in income (%)






# Recent evolution of manufacturing

- Growth recovery since the end of 2023;
- The growth was widespread.
- Increased output is associated with domestic demand and greater use of production factors.
- The sector's profitability is at a relatively high level.
- Industry's entrepreneurs mention limiting factors, either more structural or more cyclical, for the output growth, such as: tax burden, lack or cost of raw materials, lack or high cost of skilled workers, high interest rates, transport logistics, competition with imports.

### Apparent demand for industrial goods

Var % T/T-4 e contribuição dos componentes




Sources: Secex and BCB



# **Labor market – Employment**

The labor market has remained heated in recent months. The unemployment rate is at the historic low and the creation of jobs remains at a high level.

### Unemployment rate<sup>1</sup>



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Historical unemployment rate estimates following Alves, S. A. L. and Fasolo, A. M., "Not just another mixed frequency paper", Banco Central do Brasil (2015), Working Paper 400.

Sources: IBGE and BCB


### Net formal job creation




# Labor market - Income

The average real income measured by the PNAD Continuous has been growing at a more moderate pace. However, the slowdown in real income is greater than that of nominal income.

### Real average labor income



### Salaries and labor incomes






The credit market shows incipient signs of turnaround. Interest rates on non-earmarked credit increased while non-earmarked credit granting decreased in the household segment but maintained a robust growth in the corporate segment.


### Non-earmarked interest rates % p.y. 30 25 20 15 10 Oct 2020 2016 2017 2018 2019 2021 2022 2023 2024 Households low cost Companies ex revolving

### Non-earmarked new credit operations






Delinquency, indebtedness, and debt-to-income indicators remained stable, even in a scenario of growing activity and household disposable income.



# Household debt and household debt service ratio without mortgage loans



# **Projection for credit growth in 2024 and 2025**


- Nominal growth projection for the SFN credit balance in 2024 fell from 11.1% to 10.6%, within a scenario of tighter monetary policy and reassessed trajectory of earmarked corporate credit.
- For 2025, when the effects of the monetary tightening will be concentrated, nominal growth projection dropped from 10.3% to 9.6%, highlighting the downside revision for non-earmarked household credit.

12-month % change

### Credit balance

						12-month	% cnange
	Occurred			Proj. 2024		Proj. 2025	
	2022	2023	Oct 2024	Previous	Current	Previous	Current
Total	14.5	8.1	10.8	11.1	10.6	10.3	9.6
Non-earmarked	14.9	5.6	10.2	10.5	10.4	10.2	9.6
Households	17.4	8.4	11.3	12.0	11.5	11.0	10.0
Corporations	11.9	2.1	8.7	8.5	9.0	9.0	9.0
Earmarked	14.0	11.9	11.7	12.0	10.8	10.5	9.7
Households	18.0	13.1	12.8	12.0	12.0	10.5	10.0
Corporations	6.9	9.6	9.5	12.0	8.5	10.5	9.0
Total Households	17.7	10.5	12.0	12.0	11.7	10.8	10.0
Total Corporations	10.1	4.7	8.9	9.7	8.8	9.5	9.0

### Total credit outstanding






# **Fiscal**

The Central Government primary balance target for 2024 is likely to be met, considering the lower limit set, but the fiscal situation still requires attention. Uncertainties remain regarding the achievement of fiscal targets in the coming years, and projections indicate a rising public debt trajectory. The PCQ assessed the worsening of the fiscal situation since the latest Copom meeting.


### PCQ: Assessment of fiscal situation Share of responses (%) in each PCQ %



Question: How do you assess the change of the fiscal outlook since the previous Copom, considering both your baseline scenario and related risks?

Source: BCB - Pre-Copom Questionaire (PCQ)


### **Debt forecasts**



Forecast from 2024 on correspond Focus




The current situation of the external accounts, as well as their prospect, remains similar to that of the September 2024 IR.



### **Direct investment liabilities**


USD billion, 3mma s.a.



# **External accounts**


The growth of imports is associated with the increase of quantum, widespread across categories, in line with the expansion of consumption, investment, and manufacturing.


### **Quantum Index**



Source: BCB, Funcex methodology


### **Price Index**





Source: BCB, Funcex methodology

# Projections for the external accounts for 2024 and 2025





- Little change compared with what was expected in the previous IR.
- A relevant increase in the current account deficit is expected from 2023 to 2024 and a more moderate increase from 2024 to 2025. Nevertheless, the current account deficit in both years is expected to remain below net inflows of direct investment liabilities.
- **2024** current account deficit equivalent to 2.5% of GDP. Compared with the previous IR, slight downward revision for the expected trade surplus due to increased imports.
- 2025 current account deficit equivalent to 2.7% of GDP compared with 2024: stable trade balance and increased primary income deficit due to net interest expenses.




# **Commodity and producer prices**

Commodity prices have increased, especially when quoted in BRL. The producer price index, for which in recent quarters had been registered a rise associated with manufacturing, accelerated due to meat prices.









# **Consumer prices (IPCA)**

Consumer prices inflation – already high in 2024Q3 – increased. IPCA accelerated in 2024Q3, with a sharp rise in food. In the 12-month period, indexes increased for both the headline inflation (from 4.24% to 4.87%) and the average of core measures (from 3.80% to 4.21%).






# Consumer prices – Food-at-home

Consumer food prices increased strongly in the quarter, driven by beef. The pressure of coffee and soybean oil prices was also noteworthy. Prices of other industrialized food items are also on the rise, impacted by the BRL depreciation. In turn, fresh food prices fell again, even in a period of less favorable seasonality for this group.


### Contributions to quarterly changes in food-at-home prices - IPCA p.p. 3 2 -1 -2 -3 Feb May Nov Feb Nov Aug Aug May 2023 2023 2024 Industrialized Fresh Semi-industrialized Sources: IBGE and BCB

# Food-at-home inflation




# Consumer prices – Industrial goods and services

The 12-month industrial goods inflation increased, in line with the recent exchange rate trajectory.



Services inflation remains high and some of its core measures have increased compared with the previous quarter.




# **Consumer prices – Expectations**


Inflation expectations remain deanchored for the next few years and have risen since the previous IR.

### Breakdown of the revision on the 2024 Focus survey

	weights	Focus exp	ectations	s (% p.a.)
	J	Sep-13		Contr. to Δ
				(p.p.)
IPCA	100	4.35	4.84	+0.49
IPCA (by aggregation)	100	4.36	4.81	+0.45
Food-at-home	15	5.46	8.49	+0.46
Industrial goods	23	2.88	2.71	-0.04
Services	36	4.55	4.69	+0.05
Administered prices	26	4.78	4.69	-0.02
Market prices	74	4.19	4.89	+0.52
Market prices (by aggreg.)	74	4.21	4.85	+0.47

### Median market expectations (Focus) - Annual IPCA





### RELATÓRIO DE INFLAÇÃO

# Perspectivas para a inflação

# Cenário de referência de curto prazo

### **IPCA – Inflation surprise**

				1	% change
	2024				
Copom scenario <sup>1</sup>	Sep	Oct	Nov	Quarterly up to May	12- month up to Nov
Copom scenario <sup>1</sup>	0.57	0.36	0.04	0.97	4.43
Actual IPCA	0.44	0.56	0.39	1.40	4.87
Surprise (p.p.)	-0.13	0.20	0.35	0.42	0.44

Sources: IBGE and BCB

### IPCA - Short-term projections?

		Q	% change
2024	2025		
Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar
0.58	-0.08	1.17	0.42
1.54	0.89	1.68	1.51
4.89	4.37	4.72	5.00
	Dec 0.58 1.54	Dec         Jan           0.58         -0.08           1.54         0.89	2024     2025       Dec     Jan     Feb       0.58     -0.08     1.17       1.54     0.89     1.68

Sources: IBGE and BCB

### **Surprises**

- Consumer inflation in the Sep-Nov quarter was above expectations, with most of the surprise concentrated in food-athome (meat). The services segment also contributed to higherthan-expected inflation, especially food-away-from-home.
- The December projection was revised upwards, with stronger increase in beef prices and less benign behavior of administered prices.

### **Projection**


- Except for the fluctuation between January and February, 12month inflation is expected to remain above to the upper limit of the tolerance interval over the next months, amid higher monthly inflation rates.
- Contributing to high monthly inflation: food (exchange rate depreciation, pass-through of cattle price increase), industrial goods (upward producer prices, exchange rate depreciation), and services (higher inertia, heated labor market).

<sup>1/</sup> Scenario at the September Sunday Inflation Report cut-off date.


<sup>1/</sup> Copom's reference scenario at cut-off date.

# Conditional projections for inflation: conditioning assumptions

# Selic rate target assumption for projections – Focus survey expectations




# Exchange rate assumption for projections – PPP trajectory



### Four-quarter-ahead real Selic

Quarterly averages




Neutral real interest rate from 5.00%

Note: Real Selic calculated as the four-quarter-ahead Selic rate, discounted from inflation expectations for the same period, both variables extracted from the Focus survey.

### Brent-type oil price

Quarterly averages




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## **Financial conditions**

### **Financial Conditions Index**

Standard deviations in relation to the mean and contributions



Financial conditions became more restrictive in 2024Q4, mainly due to the "Interest rates in Brazil" and "Currencies" groups.

### Main factors for FCI <u>increase</u> in the quarter:

- increase of domestic interest rate futures;
- BRL depreciation;
- USD appreciation against currencies of other advanced economies;
- external interest rate futures increase in longer-terms;
- higher 5-year Credit Default Swap (CDS) for Brazil.
- domestic stock exchange fall.


### Main factors for FCI decrease in the quarter:

- VIX reduction;
- oil price reduction;
- appreciation of foreign stock exchanges;
- agricultural commodity prices increase.

# **Output** gap

Due to the economic activity surprises, the estimated output gap was once again revised upwards.

### Output Gap: estimatives and dispersion



Note: Dispersion measures were constructed using a set of output gap measures. See the box "Output gap measures in Brazil", in the June 2024 Report, for a presentation of various methodologies. Chart data: 2003Q2–2024Q4.

- The estimated output gap for 2024Q3 and 2024Q4 is 0.7%.
- The estimated output gap for 2026Q2 is 0.6%.

# Conditional projections for inflation: reference scenario

### Inflation projections - Reference scenario

YoY IPCA inflation

	2023	2024				2025				2026				2027	
Price index	IV	l	II	III	IV	l	II	III	IV	l	ll .	III	IV	l	II
IPCA	4.6	3.9	4.2	4.4	4.9	5.0	5.0	5.1	4.5	4.2	4.0	3.8	3.6	3.4	3.2
Previous IR difference (p.p.)	[0.0]	[0.0]	[0.0]	[-0.2]	[0.6]	[1.0]	[1.2]	[1.6]	[8.0]	[0.7]	[0.5]	[0.4]	[0.3]	[0.2]	-
Market prices	3.1	3.1	3.5	4.1	5.0	5.3	5.4	5.5	4.5	4.1	3.8	3.6	3.4	3.2	3.0
Previous IR difference (p.p.)	[0.0]	[0.0]	[0.0]	[-0.2]	[0.6]	[1.0]	[1.3]	[1.7]	[0.9]	[0.7]	[0.5]	[0.4]	[0.3]	[0.1]	-
Administered prices	9.1	6.4	6.4	5.5	4.6	4.1	3.9	4.0	4.5	4.6	4.6	4.4	4.1	4.0	3.8
Previous IR difference (p.p.)	[0.0]	[0.0]	[0.0]	[0.2]	[0.4]	[8.0]	[1.1]	[1.5]	[0.5]	[0.7]	[0.5]	[0.6]	[0.3]	[0.4]	-

Note: The values in white background are actuals, and those in hatched background are projections. The values presented are rounded. Therefore, the aggregated values may not match the combination of the rounded disaggregated values. The difference with respect to the previous Report is calculated using the rounded values presented.


- Inflation in 2024 mainly resulted from a combination of:
  - exchange rate depreciation,
  - strong growth pace of the economic activity,
  - o climate factors,
  - context of deanchored inflation expectations and inertia from the previous year's inflation.
- Inflation projections rose across the entire horizon, thus increasing the distance from the target and making convergence to the target more challenging.

- Main factors for the increase in medium-term projections:
  - Stronger-than-expected economic activity => increase in the estimated output gap.
  - Strong exchange rate depreciation
  - Increase in inflation expectations
  - o Inertia from the higher short-term inflation
- Main downward factors for projections:
  - Real interest rate increase

# **GDP** and **IPCA** projections




### **Actual GDP and GDP projection**



Sources: IBGE and BCB

### Actual CPI and inflation projection – IPCA



Sources: IBGE and BCB

# Final comments - Balance of risks

- Due to the materialization of risks, the Monetary Committee judges that the scenario is less uncertain and more adverse than in the previous meeting. However, the risks to its inflation scenarios remain tilted to the upside.
- Among the **upside risks** for the inflation outlook and inflation expectations, it should be emphasized:
- i. a more prolonged period of deanchoring of inflation expectations;
- ii. a stronger-than-expected resilience of services inflation due to a more positive output gap; and
- iii. a conjunction of internal and external economic policies with an inflationary impact, for example, through a persistently more depreciated currency.
- Among the **downside risks**, it should be noted:
- i. a greater-than-projected deceleration of global economic activity; and
- ii. an impact on global inflation larger than expected from monetary policy tightening.

