Network Structure Analysis of the Brazilian Interbank Market

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Abstract

The Working Papers should not be reported as representing the views of the Banco Central do Brasil. The views expressed in the papers are those of the author(s) and not necessarily reflect those of the Banco Central do Brasil.

In this paper, we provide a detailed analysis of the roles FIs play within the interbank market using a network-based approach. We investigate how the interbank network evolves with respect to different types of market participants. For this analysis, we employ several well-known complex network measures that extract topological characteristics of the interbank network. We use the weighted clustering coefficient to assess the substitutability of FIs for the lending and borrowing perspectives and find that large banking institutions are counterparties that are easily substitutable. In addition, we verify that the interbank network presents a high disassortative mixing pattern, suggesting that highly connected FIs are frequently connected to others with very few connections. This finding is in line with the fact that interbank networks often show a core-periphery structure. We also investigate the presence of the “rich-club” effect on the network and find that it is strongly present in the community comprising the large banking institutions, as they normally form near-clique structures. Since they often play the role of liquidity providers in the interbank market, this interconnectedness effectively endows the network with robustness, as participants that are with liquidity issues can easily substitute counterparties that are liquidity suppliers.

Keywords: network analysis, complex network, interbank market, systemic risk, financial stability.
JEL Classification: G01, D85, G21, G28, C63.
1 Introduction

The subprime crisis highlighted the important role played by money markets in providing liquidity for the banking system. The lack of liquidity can hamper a financial institution’s (FI’s) maturity transformation performance. If it funds long-term assets with short-term liabilities, and for some reason, cannot rollover these liabilities, it may be unable to repay its creditors. If those creditors are facing the same liquidity shortage, this may begin a cascade of repayment failures. Consequently, those FIs under stress may be forced to sell less liquid assets for cash, in order to settle their repayments, suffering losses and worsening their situation. If this process spreads along the financial system, it can trigger a confidence crisis and reduce the ability of the banking system to perform its financial intermediation role, affecting the real sector. Network topology is one of the factors that can favor the propagation described above and, thus, the consequences that follow.

In this work, we intend to characterize the Brazilian interbank network from 2008 to 2014 in terms of complex network measurements, providing economic meaning for these measurements whenever possible. Complex networks are a research area that lies at the intersection between graph theory and statistical mechanics, which endows it with a truly multidisciplinary nature (da F. Costa et al. (2005)). As highlighted by Newman (2010), one prominent advantage of employing network-based theory is that it is able to capture topological and structural characteristics of the data relationships. In this work, we take advantage of the characteristics provided by the networked representation of the interbank market to describe it in a structural and systematic way.

Using classical network analysis tools, we find that the degree measures of the interbank market participants show that the most connected FIs are large banks and that non-large banks are less connected than the others, but still participate in the market both as borrowers and lenders. In contrast, non-banks of all sizes are mostly borrowers that have, on average, zero lending relationships.

We use weighted clustering coefficients to assess the substitutability of FIs from the point of view of the observed network structure. We find that large banks usually possess larger clustering coefficients than non-banks, which indicates that they present a relevant non-sparse network structure in their surroundings. In other words, their neighborhood may invest in several other counterparties. Consequently, these large banks are more substitutable than large non-banks.

The analysis of the assortativity shows that the network present strong disassortative mixing patterns. This fact indicates a financial system in which highly connected FIs are frequently connected to others with very few connections. The joint analysis of assortativity and degree measures suggests that links between non-banks and banks are
far more typical than links among non-banks. In addition, the strong disassortative trace displayed by the Brazilian interbank market suggests the presence of a network with a core-periphery structure. In such kind of network, the peripheral vertices only connect to the core, and the core is allowed to connect to the remainder of the network, acting as intermediators in the interbank borrowing and lending processes. In fact, Fricke and Lux (2015) show that the underlying network generating process for interbank markets is better approximated by a core-periphery network generation model than by other classical network formation approaches.

Even though the disassortative pattern shown by the Brazilian interbank market suggests the existence of a core-periphery structure, that network measurement only takes into account the degree correlations between market participants. That is, it does not confirm the existence of a well-defined network core, in which its members are strongly interconnected. We can extract this type of information using another kind of network measure called “rich-club” coefficient. This index verifies the existence of the “rich-club” phenomenon, which refers to the tendency of FIs with several interbank operations to be tightly connected to each other. In fact, we find a strong “rich-club” effect for the community of FIs with large degrees. This core community is mainly composed of large banking institutions in the network.

Since large banking institutions often play the role of liquidity providers in the interbank market and are also members of a network core, their strong interconnectedness between themselves and the remainder of the peripheral network effectively gives robustness to the interbank network, as participants that are with liquidity issues can easily substitute one liquidity provider to another. This finding is in line with our conclusion that large banking institutions are easily substitutable because they present large clustering coefficient values.

From a policy-making point-of-view, it is desirable to have indicators that could be employed to identify the proper time to take macroprudential actions. However, to the extent of our knowledge, there are no works in the literature defining critical values for network measures that could be used to trigger macroprudential policy actions. This absence can be partly explained by the inherent complexity of the issue. One aspect of this issue is that there are other contagion channels and circumstances that interfere with the direct exposures channel we study here. For instance, market and funding liquidity issues, procyclicality issues leading to spirals of constraints or losses, market confidence issues or access to credit facilities that may help FIs to overcome the situation. The simultaneity of these processes requires complex models in which the direct contagion channel is just one of the many risk factors. In this context, it seems that vulnerability-based network measures, i.e., those that relate exposures to loss-absorbing buffers, would be useful in a decision-making process related to macroprudential actions. At the present stage, that
decision would need to consider other risk factors and would also require judgement. An example of macroprudential measures decision making under these complexities is BCBS (2010), who recommends the following to national authorities operating the countercyclical buffer: “Authorities are expected to apply judgement in the setting of the buffer in their jurisdiction, often using the best information available to gauge the build-up of systemic risk.” This recommendation can be applied to some of the other macroprudential tools, and conveys that the available information about systemic risk, be it derived from network measures or not, cannot be (yet) the exclusive criterium to define actions to be taken, regarding the operation of macroprudential tools.

1.1 Literature and related works

Complex networks have emerged as a unified representation of complex systems in various fields of science. They are employed to model systems that display nontrivial topology and are composed of a large amount of vertices (Newman (2010); Silva and Zhao (2015)). The recent increasing interest by the community in network-based methods is partly because networks are ubiquitous in nature and everyday life, as a myriad of systems are inherently represented by them. Examples include the Internet, the World Wide Web, biological neural networks, social networks, food webs, metabolic networks, and financial networks. Albert and Barabási (2002) highlight that the complex network representation of the data permits the unification of the structure, dynamics, and functions of a system that it represents. In this way, networks are excellent tools for evaluating the topological structures of systems with complex interactions. Albert and Barabási (2002) provide a comprehensive review on structure and dynamics of complex networks, while da F. Costa et al. (2005) focuses on network measurements.

The set of financial operations in a market is a complex system that is naturally represented by networks or graphs. The literature often studies two types of networks related to these operations (Castro Miranda et al. (2014)): payments systems and the interbank market. In this work, we focus on the interbank market. The appealing of such market is reinforced by the influential papers of Allen and Gale (2000) and Freixas et al. (2000), who advocate that a relevant channel of financial contagion is the overlapping claims that institutions have on one another. As Allen and Gale (2000) draws attention to, the default of a given market participant can lead to a domino-like series of subsequent defaults based on exposures to the defaulting entity. This fact highlights the strict and important relation between network topology and financial stability.

Following these papers, several works have investigated how the network structure affects the systemic risk and stability of a financial system. For instance, Elliott et al. (2014) study cascades of failures in a network of interdependent financial organizations,
analyzing how discontinuous changes in asset values, due to defaults and shutdowns, trigger further failures, and how this depends on network structure. In turn, Acemoglu et al. (2015) investigate the relationship between the financial network structure and the likelihood of systemic failures due to contagion of counterparty risk, and show that contagion within the interbank market exhibits a form of phase transition. If the shocks that affect FIs are small, high financial network densities enhance financial stability. However, if shocks magnitudes increase beyond a certain point, dense interconnections improve their propagation, leading to a more fragile financial system. Hence, the study of the interbank market structure and its evolution stands as an important issue in the field.

Nier et al. (2007) investigate how the structure of the financial system relates to systemic risk by varying the key parameters that define the structure of the financial system, such as level of capitalization, the degree to which banks are connected, the size of interbank exposures and the degree of concentration of the system. They show that the effect of the degree of connectivity is non-monotonic, that is, initially a small increase in connectivity increases the contagion effect; but after a certain threshold value, connectivity improves the ability of a banking system to absorb shocks. The relationship between network structure and robustness is also studied by Li and He (2012), Lee (2013) and Georg (2013). Battiston et al. (2012) investigate endogenous factors of increasing systemic risk through the contagion channel formed by credit exposure interconnections. A comprehensive review of this topic is performed by Upper (2011).

This study is here conducted using complex network measurements to characterize the Brazilian interbank network. Cajueiro and Tabak (2008) present an early application of such techniques to study the Brazilian interbank market, where they show that the Brazilian interbank market possesses weak evidence of community structure, high heterogeneity and that this market is characterized by money centers having exposures to many banks. In contrast, Boss et al. (2004) provide an empirical analysis of the network structure of the Austrian interbank market, where they show that the interbank network presents community structure that exactly mirrors the regional and sectoral organization of the actual Austrian banking system. Moreover, they show that the Austrian interbank network has low clustering coefficient and a relatively short average shortest path length.

Several other works investigate how different network measures can contribute to evaluating the systemic risk. Tabak et al. (2014) show that the directed clustering coefficient may be used as a measure of systemic risk in complex networks. Papadimitriou et al. (2013) identify core banks as those entities with the largest degrees that are present in a minimum spanning tree constructed from the correlation of the assets return variable. With this respect, the authors make a clear distinction between big and core banks in the sense that the latter are central in the network as they are shown to be crucial for network supervision.
1.2 Contributions

The contributions of this work are twofold. First, we systematically report how the Brazilian exposures network evolves with respect to several network measurements, such as: in- and out-degrees, degree distribution, clustering coefficient, assortativity, rich-club coefficient, among many others. Second, we provide economic interpretation for these network measurements, in a way that we can understand the features of a financial network using only these complex network descriptors. In contrast to graphs that cannot be easily compared with each other\footnote{The problem of verifying whether two graphs are similar is classified as a graph isomorphism problem in graph theory. K"obler et al. (1993) indicates this task as an NP-problem and, hence, intractable for large-scale graphs, such as complex networks.}, these measurements can be easily comparable throughout time, permitting us to make assertions regarding the evolution of the financial network. Moreover, only the Brazilian payments system has been investigated in the literature (cf. Castro Miranda et al. (2014)). In contrast, in this paper, we investigate the network structure of the Brazilian interbank network.

1.3 Notation

In the process of analyzing the network, we extract some network measures from the graph $G = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$ constructed from the borrowing and lending relationships of the interbank market members. To build up such network, let $\mathcal{V}$ denote the set of vertices (FIs) and $\mathcal{E}$, the set of edges. The cardinality of $\mathcal{V}$, $N = |\mathcal{V}|$, represents the number of vertices or FIs in the network. The matrix $L$ represents the liabilities matrix (weighted adjacency matrix), in which the $(i, j)$-th entry represents the liabilities of the FI (vertex) $i$ towards $j$. The set of edges $\mathcal{E}$ is given by the following filter over $L$: $\mathcal{E} = \{L_{ij} > 0 : (i, j) \in \mathcal{V}^2\}$. In our analysis, there is no netting between $i$ and $j$. As such, if an arbitrary pair of FIs owe to each other, then two directed independent edges linking each other in opposed directions will emerge. An interesting property of maintaining the gross exposures in the network is that, if an FI defaults, its debtors remain liable for their debts. We also define the matrix of exposures or assets between the FIs as $A = L^T$, where $T$ is the transpose operator. In this paper, when we do not mention the type of network that we are using, it is assumed to be the liabilities matrix $L$.

1.4 Organization

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section $\text{2}$, the methodology employed in our experiments is elucidated. In Section $\text{3}$, we provide meta-information

\footnote{Pairwise liabilities are not netted out so as to maintain consistency with the Brazilian law, because financial compensation is not always legally enforceable.}
about the exposures interbank network data set. In Section 4, the main results are discussed. Finally, in Section 5, we draw some conclusions about the obtained results.

2 Methodology

In this section, we present the network measurements that are employed in this work to extract topological information of the interbank network. In this paper, we analyze networks using classical network measurements borrowed from the complex network theory. In addition, we classify all of the employed network measurements with respect to the type of information they depend on, which can be:

- **Strictly local measures**: they are related to the inherent characteristics of the vertex itself. In this way, measures qualified as strictly local do not take into account the neighboring nor global features.

- **Quasi-local measures**: they take into account the neighborhood’s structural or topological characteristics to render information. Considering a reference vertex, the neighborhood may be its direct neighbors, or indirect neighbors. In the last case, the indirection must be limited. If it were unlimited, the measure would be classified as global, rather than quasi-local.

- **Global measures**: they make use of all of the relationships contained in the network to derive information.

For every network measure, we also provide subsidies to help in understanding its economic meaning in the context of interbank markets.

2.1 Degree (strictly local measure)

The degree or valency of a vertex $i \in \mathcal{V}$, indicated by $k_i$, is related to its connectivity, or number of links, to the remainder of the network. In directed graphs, this notion can be further decomposed into the in-degree, $k_i^{(in)}$, and out-degree, $k_i^{(out)}$, such that the identity $k_i = k_i^{(in)} + k_i^{(out)}$ holds. The domain of $k_i$ correspond to the discrete-valued interval $\{0, \ldots, 2(N-1)\}$. When $k_i = 0$, we say that vertex $i$ is a singleton vertex. Conversely, when $k_i$ is sufficiently large, we say that vertex $i$ is a hub.

The in-degree of the vertex $i$ is defined as $k_i^{(in)} = \sum_{j \in \mathcal{V}} 1_{\{L_{ji} > 0\}}$, where $1_{\{A\}}$ represents the Heaviside function that yields 1 if the logical expression $A$ evaluates to true, and 0, otherwise. In the liabilities network $L$, the in-degree represents the number of FIs in which participant $i$ has invested (is exposed to). Hence, it can be regarded as a measure of investment diversification. With a similar reasoning, the out-degree of the vertex $i$ is
defined as $k_i^{(\text{out})} = \sum_{j \in \mathcal{V}} I\{L_{ij} > 0\}$. The out-degree symbolizes, in a network of liabilities, the number of creditor FIs participant $i$ has (they are exposed to $i$). As such, it can be an indicator of funding diversification.

2.2 Strength (strictly local measure)

The strength of a vertex $i \in \mathcal{V}$, indicated by $s_i$, represents the total sum of weighted connections of $i$ towards its neighbors. Likewise the degree, the notion of strength can be further decomposed into the in-strength, $s_i^{(\text{in})}$, and out-strength, $s_i^{(\text{out})}$, such that the identity $s_i = s_i^{(\text{in})} + s_i^{(\text{out})}$ holds. The domain of $s_i$ corresponds to the continuous interval $[0, \infty)$.

The in-strength of the vertex $i$ is defined as $s_i^{(\text{in})} = \sum_{j \in \mathcal{V}} L_{ji}$. In a network of liabilities, the in-strength represents the amount of money that an FI has invested in that market, providing an indicator of total exposure of that entity to a specific market segment. Thus, the in-strength can be seem as a measure of activeness from the investment perspective or lending dependency on the interbank market segment.

In contrast, the out-strength of the vertex $i$ is defined as $k_i^{(\text{out})} = \sum_{j \in \mathcal{V}} L_{ij}$. Hence, it is a signal of activeness from the funding perspective of FIs or borrowing dependency on the interbank market segment. In a network of liabilities, the out-strength symbolizes the amount of money an FI has received from players of that market segment.

Finally, it is worth noting that the strength is a generalization of the degree measure for weighted networks. When we are dealing with non-weighted networks, the strength reduces to the degree concept.

2.3 Link distribution (strictly local measure)

The link distribution can be defined both in terms of the borrowing and lending perspectives. The link distribution may further be decomposed in degree- or strength-based distributions. The former is defined as the histogram of the vertices’ out-degrees (borrowing or funding) and in-degrees (lending or investment). The strength distribution follows the same reasoning for the degree distribution, but here we use the vertex strength indicator. In the interbank network, the link distribution is helpful for evaluating the concentration of relationships of the market represented by the network. A possible application of this analysis is to suggest the existence of money centers. Changes in the distribution itself also carry information on changes in the market players’ characteristics.
2.4 Weighted clustering coefficient of vertices (quasi-local measure)

The clustering coefficient is a measure of the extended degree to which vertices in a graph tend to cluster together, which quantifies the number of loops of order three (transitivity). Originally designed for non-weighted networks, it has been extended and adapted to weighted directed networks, as is the case of the interbank market network. The weighted clustering coefficient of a vertex \( i \in V \) is given by (Barthélemy et al. 2005):

\[
CC_i = \frac{1}{s_i(k_i - 1)} \sum_{(j,k) \in V^2} \frac{W_{ij} + W_{ik}}{2} A_{ij}A_{ik}A_{jk},
\]

in which \( CC_i \in [0, 1] \); \( W_{ij} \) is the edge weight from \( i \) to \( j \); \( A_{ij} = 1_{\{W_{ij} > 0\}} \). When \( CC_i \to 1 \), vertex \( i \) presents dense topological structures in the vicinities in the sense of triangular modules. In contrast, when \( CC_i \to 0 \), it only contains sparse structures, possibly with long linear chains of vertices.

In the context of interbank markets, the clustering coefficient can be conceptualized both for the borrowing and lending perspectives. From the borrowing perspective, the edge weights in (1) are set to \( W_{ij} = L_{ij} \), and the strengths \( s_i \) are set to \( s_i^{(\text{out})} \). From the lending perspective, we fix \( W_{ij} = (L^T)_{ij} \) and \( s_i = s_i^{(\text{in})} \). A high \( CC_i \) means that bank \( i \) is easily substitutable because the neighborhood of bank \( i \) has other nearby options to invest in (lending perspective) or borrow from (borrowing perspective). This is because neighbors of \( i \) communicate with each other as well. Conversely, if \( CC_i \) is small, few options are available for the neighbors of \( i \), implying that bank \( i \) is important in the neighborhood because its removal would drastically reduce the investment or funding alternatives in the nearby network surroundings. Consequently, \( CC_i \) can be seen as a measure of the diversification of the counterparties of \( i \).

2.5 Weighted clustering coefficient of the network (global measure)

Equation (1) quantifies the clustering coefficient of a single vertex. The idea can be extended to the entire network by averaging the weighted clustering coefficient over all of the network vertices, that is (Newman 2003b):

\[
CC = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i \in V} CC_i,
\]

in which \( CC \) assumes the same domain of \( CC_i \), i.e., \( CC \in [0, 1] \), because (2) is a convex combination of terms in the region \([0, 1]\). A financial system network with low \( CC \) has
several entities with singular properties, i.e., they are not easily substitutable. Conversely, if $CC$ is high, almost all of the participants have alternative options to invest in or borrow from and, therefore, the majority of FIs are substitutable.

2.6 Criticality (quasi-local measure)

Criticality is a measure of the impact of an FI on its neighbors if it defaults. It is the sum of the vulnerabilities of its creditors regarding their exposures to the FI and is given by:

$$C_i = \sum_{j \in \mathcal{V}} V_{ji} = \sum_{j \in \mathcal{V}} \frac{L_{ij}}{E_j},$$

(3)

where $E_j$ indicates the available resources or capital buffer of bank $j \in \mathcal{V}$ and $V_{ji}$ is the vulnerability of entities $j$ to $i$. The vulnerability $V_{ji}$ measures the impact on $j$ if $i$ defaults. The local importance of an FI in terms of the criticality index is not directly related to its size; rather, it represents its creditors’ vulnerabilities, measured by their exposures to capital buffer ratios.

2.7 Assortativity (global measure)

Assortativity is a network-level measure that, in a structural sense, quantifies the tendency of vertices to link with similar vertices in a network. The assortativity coefficient $r$ is computed as the Pearson’s correlation of degrees of vertices in each connected pair. We compute the correlation between out- and in-degrees of links between debtor and creditor FIs. Positive values of $r$ indicate that the network’s pairs of vertices have vertices in the endpoints with similar degrees, while negative values indicate endpoints with different degrees (Newman (2003a)). In general $r \in [-1, 1]$. When $r = 1$, the network has perfect assortative mixing patterns, while, it is completely disassortative in the case $r = -1$. Negative assortativity is often correlated with the existence of money centers in financial networks. Considering that $i_u$ and $k_u$ are the degrees of the two vertices at the endpoints of the $u$-th edge of a non-empty graph $G$, and that $l = |\mathcal{E}|$ is the number of edges of $G$, the network assortativity $r$ is evaluated as follows (Newman (2002)):

$$r = \frac{l^{-1} \sum_{a \in E} i_u k_u - \left[ l^{-1} \sum_{a \in E} (i_u + k_u) \right]^2}{l^{-1} \sum_{a \in E} (i_u^2 + k_u^2) - \left[ l^{-1} \sum_{a \in E} (i_u + k_u) \right]^2}.$$  

(4)

According to Silva and Zhao (2012), understanding the assortative mixing patterns...
in complex networks is important for interpreting vertex functionality and for analyzing the global properties of the networks’ components. Concerning the interbank market network, assortativity is important for the following reasons:

- When the network indicates high disassortative mixing, i.e., $r \rightarrow -1$, the majority of FIs connect with other entities with dissimilar degrees. Considering that, in these types of networks, only a few FIs have several connections (money centers), the onset of a default in these money centers directly affects a large portion of the network vertices. In this configuration, all of their neighbors that are vulnerable may, in turn, default, leading to the beginning of a contagion process throughout the network. Since there are many highly connected money centers, the network diameter tends to be small, favoring the spread of the contagion process. Now if an FI with small degree defaults, it will probably affect money centers in a direct manner. Since their capital buffers are high, they are likely to absorb all loses coming from that defaulted entity. As such, the chaining effect of subsequent defaults is retained by money centers.

- When the network indicates high assortative mixing, i.e., $r \rightarrow 1$, we expect that two types of clusters or communities will emerge in the interbank network: communities of high- and low-degree vertices. In each community, there will be more edges connecting each pair of FIs of the same group than edges cross-connecting different communities. We expect that the network will not present money centers, in the sense that they are a few highly connected FIs. The high-degree community tend to be an almost complete (clique) graph, because the number of large institutions is small and they almost connect to all of their similar pairs. With regard to the low-degree community, because there is only a small quantity of edges per each vertex, it is expected that the network structure will present long linear chains of FIs (large network diameter), so that each FI in the group will exhibit very low diversification. If a member of the high-degree community defaults, it will affect all of the connected high-degree neighbors and also a few low-degree vertices, which are more likely to be vulnerable given their lower diversification. Additionally, because the low-degree community has long linear paths of less-diversified FIs, if they are vulnerable (have low capital buffers and larger exposures), there is a higher probability that the process will cascade through the neighbors in a domino effect, onsetting a process of contagion with long paths. On the other hand, if a default occurs in a member of the low-degree community, then it is very unlikely that it will propagate to the money center cluster. However, depending on the FI's vulnerability, the same domino effect that was previously described may occur in the low-degree community. In any case, financial networks very frequently do not
present positive assortativity.

- When the network does not indicate edge attachment preferences in a global sense, we expect the graph will have a slight mixture of assortative and disassortative trends in its various different regions. During the calculation of the assortativity, these terms are canceled out, resulting in $r \approx 0$. In this configuration, we do not expect to encounter communities in the strong sense, as in the previous case.

### 2.8 Rich-club coefficient (global measure)

The rich-club coefficient measures the structural property of complex networks called “rich-club” phenomenon. This property refers to the tendency of high degree vertices (hubs) to be tightly connected to each other, forming clique or near-clique structures. This phenomenon has been discussed in several instances in both social and computer sciences. Essentially, nodes with a large number of links - usually known as rich nodes - are much more likely to form dense interconnected subgraphs (clubs) than low degree nodes. Considering that $E_{>k}$ is the number of edges among the $N_{>k}$ vertices that have degree higher than a given threshold $k$, the rich-club coefficient is expressed as [Zhou and Mondragon](2004):

$$
\phi(k) = \frac{2E_{>k}}{N_{>k}(N_{>k}-1)},
$$

(5)

where the factor $N_{>k}(N_{>k}-1)/2$ represents the maximum feasible number of edges that can exist among $N_{>k}$ vertices. We note that, while the network assortativity captures how connected similar nodes are in terms of degree connectivity, the rich-club coefficient can be viewed as a more specific notation of associativity, where we are only concerned with the connectivity of nodes beyond a certain richness metric. For example, if a network consisted of a collection of hubs and spokes, where the hubs were well connected, such a network would be considered disassortative. However, due to the strong connectedness of the hubs in the network, the network would demonstrate a strong rich-club effect.

For financial networks, the rich-club coefficient of a network is useful as a heuristic indicator of the robustness of a network. A high rich-club coefficient implies that the hubs are well connected, and global connectivity is resilient to the removal of random hubs.
3 Data

In this paper, we use a unique Brazilian database with supervisory data. From this database, we take quarterly information on Brazilian domestic interbank market exposures, supervisory variables and balance sheet statements. We use accounting information to evaluate the FIs’ capital buffers for the period from March 2011 through December 2014, in addition to September 2008. This information is vital to compute some network measurements, such as the impact susceptibility and its derived measures.

![Figure 1: Properties of the interbank network. (a) Total amount registered in the interbank market per financial instrument. (b) Interbank market assets compared to the overall cross-border payments balance. The overall cross-border balance information is extracted from the Time Series Management System, whose series code is 8266, maintained by the Central Bank of Brazil.](image)

Although exposures among FIs may be related to operations in the credit, capital and foreign exchange markets, here we focus solely on operations in the money market. The money market comprises operations with public, especially federal, securities, and private securities. Both types of operations are registered and controlled by different institutions. We have information on operations with private securities provided by Cetip,\textsuperscript{4} interfinancial deposits, debentures and repos collateralized with securities issued by the borrower FI. These operations are unsecured and their trajectories in the money market are given in Fig. 1a. We can see the amount of interfinancial deposits is prevalent against debentures and repos in the period. We note that we consider the repos from our sample as unsecured because the collateral is issued by the own borrower. The total amount invested in this market by its participants varies from US$19.33 billion to US$33.77 billions in the period analyzed (without considering September 2008), corresponding to 1.5% of the FIs’

\textsuperscript{3}The collection and manipulation of the data were conducted exclusively by the staff of the Central Bank of Brazil.

\textsuperscript{4}CETIP is an open capital company that offers services related to registration, custody, trading and settlement of assets and bonds.
total assets and 14% of their aggregated Tier 1 Capital. In Fig. 1b we compare the total interbank market assets with the net cross-border flows. There is cross-border inflow in the period, i.e., the foreign-exchange reserves are changing each month. We note that the correlation between total interbank market assets and cross-border inflow in the period is 0.38 and that the total amount flowing in the interbank market is much higher than the payments over the cross-border balance.

We use exposures among financial conglomerates and individual FIs that do not belong to a conglomerate. Intra-conglomerate exposures are not considered. They can be either banking or non-banking financial institutions. Banking FIs can be commercial banks, investment banks, savings banks and development banks. The non-banks are credit cooperatives, credit unions and brokers/dealers. Banks and non-banks are classified by size according to the same methodology applied to their groups, i.e., the group of banks and the group of non-banks. We use a simplified version of the size categories defined by the Central Bank of Brazil in a Financial Stability Report (see BCB (2012), 16...
as follows: 1) we group together the micro, small, and medium banks into the “non-large” category, and 2) the official large category is maintained in our simplified version. Therefore, instead of four segments representing the banks’ sizes, we only employ two.

Figure 2a displays the evolution of the number of interbank participants in the analyzed period. Non-large banks are the majority in the entire period. Large non-banks and non-large non-banks are present in similar quantities in the sample. The number of large banks is the minority and remains roughly constant throughout the period. Although the proportions of the analyzed segments, which are divided into banks and non-banks and size groups as defined above, remain roughly the same, the total number of FIs does change. In special, the number of FIs consistently grows until March 2013, date in which it suffers a considerable drop due to a reduction in the number of large non-banks. Afterwards, we can verify again the upward trend on the number of FIs.

Figure 2b shows the share of interbank assets for each segment. We note that large banks have a higher average market share. The seven largest banks hold more than 60% of the assets, which suggest they have a role as funds providers in the market. Figure 2c presents the mean capital buffer for the same categories of FIs. Large banks also have much higher capital buffers, which also reflect size differences.

Figure 2d shows the FIs’ average leverage by category. For the interbank market, we define leverage as the ratio of the sum of the FI’s interbank liabilities to its capital buffer. It may be seen as a measure of dependence of FIs on this market for funding purposes. In spite of being funds providers, large banks are not leveraged in this market because their liabilities are significantly lower than their capital buffers. Observe that non-large banking institutions are the most leveraged entities in this market. As such, they are active funders in the interbank network. Therefore, they are important from the systemic risk viewpoint, as they are exposed to that market. In turn, non-banking institutions present low leverage in the interbank market. This is because they operate in the interbank market mainly as investors. Thus, if they default, the interbank market will not suffer relevant losses. In any case, when an FI defaults, the network topology plays a crucial role in how losses are absorbed or propagated. For this matter, the reader is referred to the work in Souza et al. (2015), in which this propagation process is analyzed in the Brazilian interbank market.

In the original version, to classify FIs (conglomerates and individual institutions) into size categories, one initially classifies them according to the descending order of their total assets. Beginning from the FI with the highest total assets through the FI with the lowest, for each FI, one computes the ratio of the cumulative total assets along the list to the sum of the institution’s (banking or non-banking) total assets. The FIs with ratios ranging from 0% to 75% inclusive are classified as large. Similarly, those with ratios ranging from 75% to 90%, inclusive are considered medium-sized; those whose ratios range from above 90% to 99% inclusive are considered small, and those with ratios ranging from above 99% to 100% are micro-sized.
4 Results

In this section, we use the network measures presented above to gather information on the interbank market network.

4.1 Degree

We first use degree measures to obtain information on the roles played by the market participants. Figures 3a and 3b present the average in-degree of large and non-large participants in the interbank market, while Figs. 3c and 3d display the out-degree of large and non-large participants. Since we are evaluating these measures using the liabilities matrix $L$, the in-degree of FI $i$ represents the number of investors it has in the market. In contrast, the out-degree of FI $i$ denotes the number of counterparties that are funding $i$. These measures, hence, give a sense of investment and funding diversifications.

According to Fig. 3, large banks are the most connected FIs, taking both creditor
Figure 4: Cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the individual exposure values in the interbank market network in five different periods. The x-axis is in log-scale and the y-axis in linear-scale. The CDF is only computed for investments greater than 0.1 million, since they account for more than 98.3% of the operations in the interbank market.

and debtor positions in the market with about the same number of network links. The most connected large banks are linked to approximately 25% of market participants, clearly characterizing their money center role. Banks are more active on the market than non-banks, in that their in-degrees and out-degrees are higher than those of non-banks. We also note that non-banks are usually investors in this market and do not diversify, for their in-degrees are almost always less than two in the analyzed period. In addition, their out-degree is zero, meaning that they do not receive funding in this market. Considering also that they are among the most vulnerable FIs, we can conclude that if they suffer asset losses from the interbank market and default as a consequence, the resulting losses will necessarily propagate to other markets, and not to the interbank market because no players are exposed to them.

4.2 Link distribution

We now consider the distribution of pairwise investment values so as to verify the concentration of borrowing relationships in the financial system and also to check for the possible occurrences of significant changes of these distributions along time. To obtain this information, we use the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the in-strength (total interbank investment) for the interbank market network in five distinct periods, where September 2008 (crisis period) is included. Figure 4 shows this analysis, in such a manner that we can compare the investments distribution of the network from the crisis period...
against other periods. Note that the pairwise exposures in September 2008, on average, are smaller than those in the other four periods. In the other extreme, the network presents the largest pairwise exposures in December 2012. As time progresses from September 2008 onwards, we see that the CDF moves downwards, showing that the exposure values between FIs increase, on average. This phenomenon is maintained until December 2012, time in which the CDF starts to now move upwards, revealing that the average pairwise exposures begin again to decrease in magnitude.

4.3 Assortativity

Figure 5 depicts the trajectory of the network assortativity from 2008 to 2014. This chart shows that the interbank market network is disassortative because $r < 0$. This indicates a financial system in which highly connected FIs are frequently connected to others with very few connections. The joint analysis of assortativity and degree measures suggests that links between non-banks and banks are far more usual than links among non-banks. This is consistent with the presence of money centers in the network. We can see two distinctive behaviors in the network assortativity in Fig. 5: 1) a tendency to become more disassortative from March 2011 to September 2012, and 2) a tendency to become more assortative from December 2012 to December 2012. We also note that in September 2008 and in the second semester of 2013 the network presents a less disassortative mixture than the other periods. This means that the money centers are slightly more interconnected to each other and less connected to non-large FIs. These, in turn, are also more interconnected to each other (similar pairing).
4.4 Rich-club coefficient

Figure 6 portrays the trajectory of the rich club coefficient in the Brazilian interbank market evaluated for the degree thresholds $k \in \{5, 10, 20, 30\}$ from 2008 to 2014. We note that, on average, as the degree threshold gets larger, we see a more consistent “rich-club” effect in the network. For instance, when $k = 5$, the rich-club coefficient assumes low values because almost all of the banking institutions are taken into the consideration. Because non-large entities tend to connect mostly to large entities due to the high disassortative mixing pattern in the network, the rich-club effect is low. However, as we filter institutions by raising the degree threshold $k$, only more connected entities are considered. We note that, when $k \geq 20$, only entities with several operations in the interbank market are eligible in the evaluation of the rich-club coefficient in (5). These, in turn, are composed of the large banking institutions, as we can see from the in- and out-degree shown in Fig. 3. Because of the large values of the rich-club coefficient, these large entities present the “rich-club” effect and therefore tend to form near-clique structures (complete graphs). Since they often play the role of liquidity providers in the interbank market, this phenomenon effectively gives robustness to the interbank network, as participants that are with liquidity issues can easily substitute one liquidity provider to another. Interestingly, we see that, during the crisis in September 2008, the “rich-club” formed by all of the institutions with more than 30 operations is a complete graph (clique). We also note that for $k = 30$, the rich-club coefficient has roughly the same trajectory of the network assortativity. Thus, it seems that, specially about the half of 2012, part of the assortativity decrease observed was due to the decrease in the number of connections between large FIs.
4.5 Weighted clustering coefficient of FIs

Another point in financial stability analysis is the resilience of the financial system to the removal of an FI, which is also an overall measure of the diversification of its counterparties. To obtain this information, we analyze the network weighted clustering coefficient. We note that to compute the clustering coefficient of an FI, we can consider clusters formed from the perspectives of its borrowing or lending relationships, i.e., the computation is related to the FI’s out- or in-strength, respectively.

Figures 7a and 7b display the average clustering coefficient (CC) of large and non-large financial institutions from the borrower perspective. According to Figure 7a, large banks usually possess higher clustering coefficients than non-banks, revealing that they present a relevant non-sparse network structure in their surroundings, in the sense that their lenders communicate with each other. Moreover, large banks are more substitutable than large non-banks because of their large CC. That means that their neighbors can choose other counterparties to fund themselves. In contrast, according to Fig. 3 large
non-banks play roughly the role of investors. Most of the time, their average out-degree is zero, meaning that they are connected to the network by inward links (investment relationships). These non-banking FIs usually invest (in-degree) in two large banks, which, in turn, have high in- and out-degrees. Therefore, they contribute to increasing the borrower CC of large banks.

In Fig. 7b, which shows the CC for non-large institutions, we see the same picture: banks have higher clustering coefficients than non-banks due to their higher average out-degrees and their tendency to relate to large banks, which in turn are the most diversified FIs. Looking at the interbank market, we can see that each of the non-large banks typically borrows from two or more large banks and also takes investments from non-banking institutions.

Figures 7c and 7d display the average clustering coefficient of large and non-large financial institutions from the lender perspective. Large non-banks have higher clustering coefficient than large banks from this perspective. The reason behind that is as follows. First, they have very few, but not zero, investments. Moreover, considering that they often invest in large banks and that the graph component comprising only large banks is almost a clique (complete graph), there will be some kind of relationship between the two invested large banks with high probability. Therefore, large non-banks will form much of the potential triangles between the (often two) counterparties and, as a result, will present a high clustering coefficient.

A similar panorama happens with the clustering coefficient from the lender perspective for non-large institutions, as Fig. 7d reveals. In this case, the large banks CC value is not as high as the large non-banks, because non-large non-banks often invest in more than two counterparties (recall Fig. 3b). As the number of counterparties increase, the number of potential triangles between counterparties exponentially increase as well, the tendency is that non-large non-banks to have a smaller value of the CC.

### 4.6 Weighted clustering coefficient of the network

Figures 8a and 8b present the weighted clustering coefficient of the network from the borrowing and lending perspectives, respectively. We note a downward trend in both perspectives, meaning that members in the network are becoming harder to be substituted. Given an FI \(i\), this happens because neighbors of \(i\) are less likely to be interconnected if the clustering coefficient of \(i\) is low. This is true because, in this scenario, on average, there are less triangular structural patterns in the network. The decrease in the network

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6 In reality, from Fig. 3a (investment diversification) and 3c (funding diversification), we see that non-banking institutions do not take funds from the money market. Instead, they act solely as investors in this market segment.

7 In this case, only two triangles are possible. If the communication between the invested counterparties is bidirectional, then the large non-bank will have maximum clustering coefficient.
weighted clustering coefficient can also be related to the diminish of the number of active operations in the money market, as we can see from the downwards trends of the in- and out-degree of FIs in Fig. 8.

4.7 Criticality

We now analyze the criticality (cf. (3)), which is a network measure that can be used as a quasi-local importance indicator of participants in the interbank network. For a given FI, this equation takes into account only the vulnerabilities of that FI’s direct neighbors. We present mean criticalities by FI size category in Figs. 9a and 9b. On average, large banks have a higher number of creditors (cf. Fig. 3); thus, even if they are not especially vulnerable individually, the sum of the vulnerabilities tends to be higher. Non-large banks present lower criticality than large banks, because they have a smaller number of creditors on average. Non-banking institutions show zero average criticality as their average number of creditors in the interbank market is zero, because they do not take funds in the money market. According to this criterion, an FI may have only small vulnerable FIs as counterparties and be critical; however, the FI’s impact on the entire financial system will not be important.

5 Conclusion

In this work, we have investigated the roles FIs play within the Brazilian interbank market using an approach based on complex networks. One prominent advantage of employing network-based theory is that it is able to capture topological and structural characteristics of the players’ relationships from the data representation itself. Using a classical
network analysis approach on the Brazilian interbank market from 2008 to 2014, we have seen that the network presents strong disassortative mixing along the entire studied period. This characteristic suggests that highly connected FIs are frequently connected to others with very few connections. This observation is consistent to the fact that interbank networks frequently have money centers, which act as hubs to non-large institutions. Using this fact together with the link distribution, we have seen that connections between non-banking and banking institutions are far more typical than links among pairs of non-banking institutions. Furthermore, we have employed the weighted clustering coefficient as an FI substitutability indicator, showing that large banks are more substitutable than large non-banks in the borrowing perspective. Employing the classical criticality measure, we have seen that large banking institutions are more critical to the remainder of the FIs. In special, we have seen that, during the crisis, the criticality of large banking institutions achieves its maximum value in the studied period.

We have also studied the “rich-club” effect on the Brazilian interbank network. We have found a strong presence of the “rich-club” property in the community formed by the large banking institutions, as they tend to form near-clique structures (complete graphs). Since they often play the role of liquidity providers in the interbank market, this phenomenon effectively gives robustness to the interbank network, as participants that are with liquidity issues can easily substitute their counterparties that are liquidity providers. Moreover, we have seen that the “rich-club” coefficient assumed its maximum theoretical value in September 2008, showing that the core entities in the “rich-club” formed a complete graph.

In this paper, we have focused on topological measures that take into account the linkages, either weighted or not, between FIs, with only a glimpse on vulnerability measures, such as criticality. A natural development from this point is to quantify, given an

**Figure 9:** Trajectory of the network criticality for static snapshots of the interbank network in different periods.
FI’s vulnerabilities, how vulnerable and harmful that FI is to the financial system, specially if these features have only local reach or if they also reach indirect neighbors. This is left for future work. Furthermore, this paper deals with one contagion channel, the direct contagion channel. The study of interactions between this channel and others will also enrich our comprehension on contagion risk in financial systems, improving the information that can be used by the decision making process related to the operation of macroprudential tools.

References


