

# *Financial Instability and Credit Constraint: Evidence from the Cost of Bank Financing*

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Discussion by

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# What does this paper do?

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- Examines the change in cost of bank financing for working capital loans surrounding the financial crisis of 2008.
- Since the Lehman Brothers default and the ensuing crisis was exogenous to the Brazilian economy, this shock resulted in an exogenous inward shift in the supply of bank-loans. This, in turn, allows the paper to trace a causal link from credit supply to important borrower effects.
  - Cross-sectional changes in the cost of bank financing.
  - Nice as it allows one to identify which firms are affected the most during times of crisis.

# Contributions

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- Larger increase in the cost of bank credit for more financially constrained firms (those that paid a higher lending rate, those that obtained few loans before the crisis).
  - New measure of credit constraint
  - Provides evidence that credit supply shocks have differential impacts across firms in the economy.
- Rise in cost of credit greater for (1) large firms (2) firms with longer bank relationships.
- Rise lower for firms that (1) borrowed from several lenders before the crisis and (2) were collateralized.

# Some Suggestions

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- What are the implications of the potential endogeneity of cost of bank financing with maturity and size of loans on your empirical estimation?
  - Result show they negatively correlated, should maturity be on the right hand side?
  - If are assume they are exogenous, then use volume as right hand side variable.
  - Other characteristics such as collateralized amount could also be endogenous.

# Some Suggestions

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- What firms have access to public debt markets?
  - This also could provide some heterogeneity in exposure to the credit shock.
- Are some banks more exposed to the financial crisis?
  - can one get data on U.S. exposures?
- Large firm result puzzling.
  - “export argument” seems at odds with “multinational backstop”.
- More discussion on potential selection bias
  - Only observe firms that could get, or needed, *bank* loans.

# A big suggestion: Go the final step

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- That is: firm *performance*.
- Its very nice to show a better measure of financial constraint seems to “work”, but the big question is how credit shocks ultimately affect firm performance.
  - Do more financially constrained firms perform worse during the crisis?

# Firm Performance

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- The 2008 crisis emphasizes the need to understand the impact of shocks to providers of capital on their borrowers.
- If a firm can easily access external capital markets or switch from one source of private capital to another, then its performance should be insensitive to the shocks experienced by its capital providers.
- However, with frictions (adverse selection and moral hazard) in the economy, shocks that affect banks' ability to supply capital might result in suboptimal investment and working-capital management decisions for firms that extensively depend on them.

# Firm Performance

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- Therefore, a firm's performance should be sensitive to unanticipated shocks experienced by the suppliers of its capital over and above the firm specific demand side characteristics such as profitability and growth opportunities.
- Establishing this link between a borrower's performance and its supply of credit has important implications for corporate finance and monetary policies.
- Huge identification challenge: separating the effect of firm-specific demand-side shocks (such as profitability and growth opportunity) from the supply-side shock.



# Identification Challenges

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1. If common economic shocks affect the performance of both the banking-sector and the real economy, then the task of separating the effect of firm-specific factors from bank-specific shocks becomes more difficult.
2. Further, if deterioration in a bank's health is itself caused by its borrowers' poor performance, then researchers face an uphill task in establishing the causation in the other direction.

# What this paper can do

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- Since the Lehman Brothers default and the ensuing crisis was exogenous to the Brazilian economy, this shock resulted in an exogenous inward shift in the supply of bank-loans. This, in turn, allows the paper to trace a causal link from credit supply to borrower performance
  - Stock prices/accounting performance, etc.
  - Further, can exploit cross-sectional differences in the degree of financial constraints since we now have a good measure.
  - This would really complete the circle.

# *Macroeconomic Determinants of Banking Default by Corporations in Brazil*

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# Motivation

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- Large increase in bank credit extended to Brazilian firms.
- Scarcity of research on the link between macroeconomic environment and default by corporations borrowing bank credit.

# Empirical Strategy

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- New default measure: ratio between # of credit operations past due between 61 to 90 days at the end of the month and the number of operations without delay at M-3.
- Structural Equation Model (SEM)
- Autoregressive vector model with exogenous variables (VARX)

# Findings/Contributions

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- Appreciation of the Dollar against the Real increases default with a 2 month lag.
- Increase of Selic interest rate increases default with a lag of 8 months.
- However, both these effects are small compared to the impact that economic activity, measured by physical production, has on corporations default.
- Policy impact: Most important macroeconomic policy is the one that enables the growth of economic activity.

# Comments

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- Cost/benefits of Macro versus firm-level models
  - Sample sizes
  - Fit
  - Policy implications
- Exposition Suggestions:
  - More detail in Tables
  - More comparison of main findings to other countries
    - Macro and firm level